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Abstract: This paper evaluates how the introduction of professional police forces affected crime 
using two natural experiments in history: the 1829 formation of the London Metropolitan Police 
(the first police force ever tasked with deterring crime) and the 1839 to 1856 county roll-out of 
forces in England and Wales. The London Met analysis relies on two complementary data 
sources. The first, trial data with geocoded crime locations, allows for a difference-in-
differences estimation that finds a significant and persistent reduction in robbery but not 
homicide or burglary. A pre-post analysis of the second source, daily police reports of both 
cleared and uncleared crime incidents, finds a significant reduction in all violent crimes but 
offsetting changes in uncleared (decrease) and cleared (increase) property crimes. These (local) 
reductions in crime are not just due to crime displacement but represent true decreases in overall 
crime. Difference-in-difference analyses of the county roll-out find that only sufficiently large 
forces, measured by the population to force ratio, significantly reduced crime. The results are 
robust to controlling for spill-over effects of neighboring forces.  
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1. Introduction   
An extensive empirical literature testing one of the core components of Becker’s (1968) 
economic model of crime – the role played by the probability of apprehension – has resulted in 
a general “consensus that increases in police manpower reduce crime” (Chalfin and McCrary, 
2017).1 Most of this existing literature is based on (often temporary) expansions to the size of 
an existing police force, thereby estimating the marginal effect of an additional officer to an 
already established force. Yet, much is still unknown about the more fundamental relationship 
between police and crime. Specifically, how does the effectiveness of police in combatting 
crime depend on (i) the tasks assigned to an officer, (ii) police force characteristics, including 
size and/or age, and (iii) police (force) quality? To begin to address these questions, we study 
the introduction of professional forces on crime, which profoundly changed the nature of 
policing, by tasking officers - for the first time ever - with deterring crime.  
Specifically, our paper uses two natural experiments in history: the formation of the first 
professional force in the world – the London Metropolitan Police (the ‘Met’) in October 1829 
– and the roll-out of rural county forces in England and Wales over the next 30 years. Cities 
across the United States and around the world modelled their own police departments on the 
Met and, most prominently, adopted its innovative emphasis on crime prevention or 
deterrence.2 These newly created institutions, which still exist today, are a fundamental 
component of the contemporary criminal justice system.  
In contrast to the existing police-crime literature, we study a large shock to the institution 
of ‘policing’ – the introduction of a large, professional and institutionalized police force with 
the explicit aim of crime prevention. Specifically, there were three distinguishing features of 
these new professional police forces. First, they represented a substantial increase in numbers: 
in London, 1000 men were hired over-night (an approximately ten-fold increase over the pre-
existing informal ‘police’), and the force expanded to 3000 men soon after. Second, there was 
a shift from reactionary policing focused on catching criminals for financial reward towards 
prevention and deterrence by slowly walking a small beat and being visibly present (Emsley, 
2009). Third, there was a new-found emphasis on police quality. Many features of modern-day 
 
1 Empirical evidence of the crime reducing effect of police was elusive due to both simultaneity bias – more police 
are hired in higher crime locations or times – and measurement error in the number of police (Chalfin and McCrary, 
2018). Levitt (1997) was amongst the first to try to causally identify a crime-reducing effect of police with natural 
experiments that locally or temporarily increased police numbers. See Chalfin and McCarary (2017) for a recent 
review and Cameron (1988) for a review of the early literature that did not account for this simultaneity bias. 
2 U.S. police forces were established in New York City (1845), New Orleans and Cincinnati (1852), Boston and 
Philadelphia (1854), Chicago and Milwaukee (1855) and Baltimore and Newark (1857). See Uchida (2015) and 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/police/Early-police-in-the-United-States (viewed October 22, 2018). 
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policing were thus introduced for the first time during this period. A second contrast with much 
of the existing literature is that our natural experiments consist of two permanent shocks to 
policing.3 Finally, exploiting variation in the officer to population ratio across counties at the 
time of force formation, we can begin addressing the question of whether the (marginal) effect 
of police on crime depends on force characteristics.  
The historical context of our study allows for contributions to two additional literatures. 
First, we enhance explanations of 19th century crime trends in England and Wales: Crime rose 
in the first half of the century but was followed by a decline in the latter half despite the growing 
population – an ‘English miracle’ (Taylor, 1998). Did the formation of professional police 
forces contribute to this pattern?4 Second, we contribute to the literature studying the extent to 
which institutions, like mass education and public spending, explain long-run economic growth, 
the development of human and social capital, and state capacity – a state’s ability to implement 
its intended policies.5 While this literature mostly takes a macro-perspective, our paper studies 
the micro-foundations of these questions for one such institution – police. Given the potentially 
important role of the level of societal crime for explaining economic growth and development 
(e.g. Mauro, 1995) and the state’s ability to govern, understanding the extent to which crime 
was affected by this new institution is an important contribution.   
Identifying the effect of the new police on crime is not a simple matter. One potential 
confounder is an increase in reporting of crimes to the police (even if there was no change in 
criminal behavior). This would only have happened if there was increased societal trust in 
‘police’. Yet, anecdotal evidence suggests that, at least initially, there were anti-police 
sentiments: even a magistrate stated that “a strong feeling existed against the new police” upon 
the Met’s formation.6 We do not rely on only anecdotal evidence, however, and note that 
concerns regarding changes in reporting are further alleviated by the fact that crimes were 
reported to magistrates’ offices in London, both prior to and after the introduction of the Met, 
 
3 These new police are likely to have been perceived as permanent given the magnitude of the intervention (in 
London) and the fact that the county roll-out started ten years after (and was modelled after) the Met. 
4 Wong (1995) emphasizes opportunities for legal and illegal gains from 1857 to 1892. Wolpin (1978) looks at the 
relationship between crime and the rates of clearance, conviction, imprisonment, and fines, as well as average 
sentences from 1894 to 1967. See Bignon et al. (2017), Mehlum et al. (2006) and Traxler and Burhop (2010)  for 
studies of historical crime in France, Bavaria and Prussia, respectively. 
5 See, for instance,  Squicciarini and Voigtländer (2015), Becker et al. (2011), Besley and Persson (2009), and 
Acemoglu et al. (2016). 
6 The magistrate quote is published in an October 1, 1829 issue of The Morning Journal. On the same date, the 
Morning Herald quotes a member of a mob shouting “it is one of Peel’s bloody police; they are all thieves 
themselves”. Sir Robert Peel was the Home Secretary from 1822 to 1830 and regarded as the founder of modern-
day policing. These articles are part of a collection on the Open University website (viewed May 7, 2019): 
 https://www.open.ac.uk/Arts/history-from-police-archives/MphcR1/Scrapbooks/sbIntro.html . 
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and not directly to the new police. In addition, some of our analysis emphasizes the most serious 
crimes of robbery, burglary, and murder, which are arguably less subject to concerns about 
reporting. Another potential confounder is that an increased ability to detect crime could have 
led to more charges, even if the number of crimes committed did not change; i.e. there could 
have been an increase in clearance rates. This would have been expected as the new force was 
substantially larger than the previously existing informal police. Note that such increased 
detection would also have been expected to reduce crime through incapacitation (over and 
above deterrence). To disentangle whether the new forces reduced crime (through deterrence 
and/or incapacitation) from increases in crime reporting and clearance rates (the potential 
confounders), we rely on two types of crime measures – incidents and charges.7 Incident level 
data is especially important as it allows us to abstract from the potential problem of crime 
reducing effects being masked by increased clearance rates (one of the confounders), which 
could potentially happen when studying an administrative measure like charges.  
The closest existing literature to our study includes those papers studying police 
deployment on the streets.8 A number of studies report a crime reduction following temporal 
variation in (often non-permanent) police deployment, including post-terrorist attack increases 
in deployment in London (Draca et al., 2011) and Buenos Aires (Di Tella and Schargrosky, 
2004).9 However, Blanes I Vidal and Mastrobuoni (2018) do not find significant effects of non-
terrorist attack related temporary increases in patrols. Negative effects of visible police presence 
on crime have also been found in studies of private policing using geographic boundaries 
(MacDonald et al., 2015; Heaton et al., 2016); these studies use spatial variation in force 
allocation to understand the permanent effect of policing.10 In contrast, our study estimates the 
effect of a permanent change in policing, exploiting variation both over time and across space. 
The first part of our empirical analysis studies the impact of the 1829 formation of the 
Met on crime in London. With the exception of the ‘City’ of London (which still has its own 
force today), the initial catchment area of the Met was within an approximate 7-mile radius of 
Charing Cross, London.11 Because not all of London is initially ‘treated’ by the formation of 
 
7 Incidents refer to a reported offense (regardless of whether it is cleared or not), while charges can only be filed 
when there is a suspect associated with that offense. 
8 Studies have considered the extensive margin (temporary) destruction of a police force. As described by Nagin 
(2013), Andenaes finds a rise in crime rates, especially street crimes like robbery, after German soldiers arrested 
all members of the Danish police in 1944. Others have studied the effects of police strikes (Pfuhl, 1983) and 
slowdowns (Cann Chandrasekher, 2016), though the latter differs from the extensive margin. 
9 Negative effects of police on crime are also found by Klick and Tabarrok (2005) following increases in 
Washington DC terrorist alert levels and Weisburd (2017) using variation in officers leaving their beats unattended. 
10 To the extent that decreased response times imply an increase in police presence, Blanes I Vidal and Kirchmaier 
(2018) find a relationship between response time and the likelihood of clearing a crime.  
11 The City of London refers a 1-square mile area (today’s central business district) in Central London.  
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the Met, our analysis relies on geocoding historical crime data from two data sources into 
‘treated’ and ‘control’ regions of London for periods before and after the Met was created.  
First, we use felony trial data reported in the Proceedings of the Old Bailey (Central 
Criminal Court of London and County of Middlesex) for the most serious offenses of burglary, 
manslaughter/murder, and robbery, for which we manually coded the number and type of police 
witnesses and geocoded offense locations intro treated and control regions. Thus, the Old Bailey 
data allow us to directly observe reform implementation: there is an instant shift in the type of 
police witnesses (‘old’ to ‘new’) that is by far largest in the treated area. Moreover, it allows 
for a difference-in-differences model. The second source consists of daily police reports for 
nine police offices run by the pre-1829 magistrates (and continued until 1839), who were tasked 
with processing crimes for all of London. These reports include three crime measures: 
‘informations’ and stolen property reports (which one can interpret as uncleared crime 
incidents) and charges (which are cleared crimes). Though all offenses are included (as opposed 
to selected felonies at the Old Bailey), they cannot be geocoded, necessitating pre-post designs. 
Both London analyses provide evidence consistent with a crime-reducing effect, 
especially for violent crimes (including robbery). A significant and persistent reduction in trials 
is seen for robbery (more than 40%) in the Old Bailey data, but no (consistently) significant 
effect for homicide and burglary trials. Using the daily reports data for London, we find a 
significant reduction in violent crime (driven by reductions in both cleared and uncleared 
crime), whereas there is a significant reduction in uncleared property crime incidents but an 
increase in cleared property crimes (charges). As the latter effect dominates in the daily reports 
data (which include a wide range of property offenses), these off-setting channels provide a 
potential explanation for the lack of a property crime (burglary) effect in the Old Bailey data.     
The second part of our analysis studies the impact of the introduction of police forces to 
the counties of England and Wales; such forces were allowed for in 1839 but did not become 
mandatory until 1856. The county analysis complements the London analysis in a number of 
ways – but perhaps first and foremost, it increases the external validity of the results: Are they 
specific to London in the 1830s? Moreover, as the county forces were all of different sizes 
(relative to the population) upon creation, we can use the county roll-out of police forces to 
further our understanding of how the effect of a police force depends on its characteristics. Of 
the 48 counties in our analysis, 16 created forces in 1840, 23 in 1857, and 9 in the intermediate 
years. We use a difference-in-differences model to identify the effect of creating professional 
police forces on crime, overall and for forces of different sizes, where 1,000 people per officer 
was the nationally recommended (but rarely achieved) guideline. Our main crime measure (the 
5 
 
only one available both pre- and post-reform) is the annual number of persons committed to 
trial by crime type (transcribed from historical Judicial Statistics yearbooks). 
We find no overall effect of creating just any professional police force. But, creating a 
force that was closer in relative size to the nationally recommended threshold reduced crime 
overall (19%) and across categories (18% for violent, 14% for property, but no significant effect 
for other offenses); relatively smaller forces did not have a net crime reducing effect (i.e. 
observable in administrative data). Event-study specifications show that the crime-reducing 
effect of large forces is not immediate (delayed by one to two years) and increases over time. 
Insignificant leads support the parallel trend assumption and a lack of anticipatory effects.  
Finally, we pay careful attention to the potential role of spill-overs and crime 
displacement in the analyses of both the Met and county forces. Spill-overs may lead to a 
reduction in crime in neighboring areas, if there are spill-overs either in policing across 
catchment areas or in deterrence and/or incapacitation effects. In contrast, crime in neighboring 
areas can increase if criminals simply migrate away from the policed areas to commit crimes 
elsewhere (crime displacement). The extent to which the latter applies is clearly relevant to 
identify whether the introduction of police reduced crime overall or just locally. Using the 
geocoded Old Bailey data, we find little evidence of displacement within London from inside 
to just outside the Met’s catchment area. Similarly, we do not find evidence suggestive of crime 
displacement from London/Middlesex to neighboring counties after the introduction of the Met. 
Finally, though our main county results are robust to controlling for spill-over effects of 
neighboring forces, the existence of neighboring forces does indeed have an impact on local 
county crime: neighbors with relatively large forces decrease local crime while those with 
relatively small forces increase local property crime.  
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides institutional details 
related to the 1829 creation of the Met and the subsequent roll-out of county police forces. 
Sections 3 and 4 present data and analysis for the Met and county roll-out, respectively. Section 
5 concludes with a discussion of the external validity of these historical experiments to today.  
 
2. Institutional Background 
This section highlights the institutional context and details of the introduction of the London 
Metropolitan Police Force and the county force roll-out. Other criminal justice reforms (e.g. 
abolishing capital punishment) and societal changes (e.g. population growth) that are relevant 
to the analysis will be discussed in detail throughout the paper. 
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2.1. The Introduction of the London Metropolitan Police in 1829 
The idea of policing did, of course, exist prior to the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829. In fact, 
unpaid and part-time local (night) watchmen date to the Westminster Watch Act of 1735. 
London’s Bow Street Runners, who were sworn constables of Westminster, date to around 1750 
(Emsley, 2009). As there were only eight, they did not have a physical presence and were not 
meant to deter crime, but rather to locate and arrest serious offenders. Initially, these Runners 
were similar to the 18th century thief-takers, i.e. men who earned their livings from private and 
public rewards upon the convictions of ‘serious’ criminals. By the end of the 1700s, however, 
the Runners were essentially full-time policemen located at the Bow Street house, which 
became a centralized collection point of crime incidents for the Runners to follow-up on.12  
The Bow Street office was used as a model to establish seven additional Police Offices in 
the Middlesex Justices Act of 1792: Queen's Square, Great Marlborough Street, Worship Street, 
Lambeth Street, Shadwell (replaced by Marylebone High Street by 1816), Union Hall and 
Hatton Garden. A Thames River police was established in Wapping in 1798. Each office was 
staffed by three magistrates and up to 12 constables (Emsley, 2009). That is, there were less 
than 150 policemen in London prior to the creation of the Metropolitan Police and their primary 
purpose was to follow up on crime reports. The magistrates had two main responsibilities: to 
supervise the constables and process criminal cases. Upon the creation of the Met, the 
magistrates lost control of the existing ‘police’ to the new Metropolitan Police commissioners 
but retained their judiciary role (Davis, 1984). Thus, despite the separation of policing and 
magistracy responsibilities, these police (or magistracy) offices played an essential role in crime 
processing. Even post-Met, a known offender would be processed through these offices (which 
existed until 1839) and recorded in the daily reports from these offices (as reflected in the 
introductory text of these reports).  
Finally, the Metropolitan Police Act (10 Geo.4, c.44) created the London Metropolitan 
Police (the ‘Met’) on September 29, 1829. This was the first professional police force in the 
world. Initially 1,000 men strong, there were more than 3,000 officers by May 1830: in other 
words, in just six months, there was a more than 20-fold increase in the number of officers in 
London (from around 150 pre-Met). Panel A of Figure 1 documents the weekly number of hires 
from September 1829 to March 1830, and Panel B the Met’s weekly growth until 1856. It shows 
that (i) initial hiring happened in two stages, with hiring of recruits for six inner divisions in 
September 1829 and the 11 outer divisions in February 1830 (see Appendix Table A1) and (ii) 
 
12 This summary is based largely on the London Lives website (accessed February 6, 2018): 
 https://www.londonlives.org/static/Policing.jsp  
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the Met grew almost constantly in the next 30 years to about 6,000 men in 1856.  
The initial catchment area of the Met was within an approximately 7-mile radius from 
Charing Cross in Central London and extended to 15-miles in 1839.13 Excluded from the initial 
catchment area, however, were the City of London (which established its own force in 1832, 
expanded in 1839 and still distinct today) and, until 1839, the Thames River Police.14 Panel A 
of Figure 2 presents a historical map of the original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Police. 
Panel B shows that the (geocoded) pre-existing police offices were centrally located within the 
7-mile radius (and even a smaller 4-mile radius). Appendix Table A1 shows that an equal 
number of police were hired into each division, regardless of the geographic size. This implies 
that the Met Police were likely to be more visible on their beats in the smaller inner divisions. 
There is thus a potentially more intense treatment in a shorter radius around Charing Cross.  
On October 6, 1829, the Metropolitan Police opened its first station – Scotland Yard – on 
a street called Great Scotland Yard (near 4 Whitehall Place and Charing Cross). This became 
the home station of the Met, including the two police commissioners.15 As the force expanded, 
other buildings in this area were taken over, but eventually the Met started opening police 
stations throughout London. To the best of our knowledge, few if any stations were opened in 
the 1830s. The earliest schedule of Met Police stations we have found dates to May 1, 1873, 
listing each station by police division, including the tenure at the current building (though not 
all have dates). There are more than 175 stations listed but less than 10 with leases dating to the 
early 1830s (and this includes Bow Street, Marylebone, Marlborough, and Scotland Yard).16  
In addition to the sharp and large increase in the sheer number of ‘police’, there was a 
shift in the primary task of an officer to deterrence. To this end, Metropolitan Police officers 
were assigned to walk a beat – a regular route – at a pace of 2.5 miles per hour; the beat was 
intentionally small to increase visibility and the new policemen ‘were supposed to get to know 
 
13 While all descriptions of the formation of the Met describe this 7-mile radius, no explicit distance was written 
in the original act. Rather, the Act includes a “List of the parishes, townships, precincts, and places constituting 
‘The Metropolitan Police District’”. That list includes 88 parishes or places for which we geocoded the main point 
of interest (e.g. parish church); 85 lie within 7-miles from Charing Cross and all are within 8-miles. Moreover, 
75% of the locations are within 4-miles. Our main analysis uses the 7-mile radius to define all potentially treated 
areas, but also breaks this up into a treated inner circle and potentially less intensely treated outer circle (i.e. patrols 
are less visible due to the larger geographic area). We also test the robustness of our results to an 8-mile radius.  
14 Before 1832, ‘policing’ in the City of London was the responsibility of the City’s Day Patrol and Night Patrol. 
By 1803, these patrols were 16 men strong and increased to 49 men by 1815. In April 1832, the City Day Police, 
incorporating the previous Day Patrol and expanded to 100 men, became fully operational. In November 1838, 
the City Day Police and the Nightly Watch (which had replaced the Night Patrol), merged into one establishment 
from which the City of London Police was created in August 1839. This information is based on a leaflet, accessed 
on the London Metropolitan Archives website on May 17, 2018: https://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/things-to-
do/london-metropolitan-archives/visitor-information/Documents/01-family-history-at-lma.pdf  
15 http://www.historyhouse.co.uk/articles/scotland_yard.html, accessed April 29, 2019. 
16 See MEPO 4/234 from the National Archives. 
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everyone who lived on these beats’.17 Increased standards and quality may also have increased 
the effectiveness of the new police. Documents reporting the reason of removal of officers from 
the force make clear that ‘police quality’ was taken seriously. Panel A of Figure 3 shows the 
weekly number of leavers among those recruited before March 1831. Panels B and C show the 
weekly number of post-1833 removals by broad reason (resignation, dismissal or death) and 
dismissals by reason (drunk, neglect or misconduct, criminal behavior or other). These figures 
demonstrate high turnover especially at the very beginnings of the Met; one can even observe 
annual firing spikes for being drunk on duty around Christmas. 
Who were the men in the new police? When the Met was created, selection criteria were 
not yet strict and men between the ages of 18 and 35 were eligible to apply. The job was 
physically demanding and subject to strict discipline as highlighted above, but offered more 
security than other work places and, as such, attracted, among others, previously unemployed 
workers (see Dell, 2004). The new police were paid a wage comparable to that of an unskilled 
agricultural worker, in an effort to recruit men who did not resemble gentlemen and who could 
gain the trust of the everyday man.18 As work conditions became more attractive over time, 
recruitment became more restrictive in terms of age and physical requirements. The new police 
received very little training – the first formal training school was only established in 1907.19  
One question that naturally arises is whether the new officers were just the old ‘police’ 
with a new job title. We argue that this is unlikely given that the size of the ‘old police’ amounts 
to only less than 3% of the size of the Met by May 1830.20 Moreover, even if some of the old 
police did become Met officers, they were not doing the same job – they were now patrolling 
the streets of London to deter crime. This newfound emphasis on deterrence is a fundamental 
component of the institutional changes being studied here.  
Clearly, a relevant question is why the Met was created. Was it a direct response to rising 
crime? This is indeed possible as the 1829 Metropolitan Police Act itself states:  
 
17 While this was possible in the inner divisions in Central London, beats in the outer divisions were often larger 
and it is plausible that policemen in these divisions were not able to fulfill these tasks (see Emsley, 2009). 
18 See https://www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/History%20of%20Police%20Office%20Pay%20Framework.pdf, 
last accessed October 22, 2018. 
19 See http://www.open.ac.uk/Arts/history-from-police-archives/Met6Kt/PoliceWorker/pwRecPol.html and 
http://www.open.ac.uk/Arts/history-from-police-archives/Met6Kt/PoliceWorker/pwTrain.html for further detail 
(both last accessed on October 4, 2019). 
20 We support this conclusion by comparing registers of the first 3,000 officers hired by the Met (Source: MEPO 
4/31, National Archives London) to those hired into the Bow Street Foot Patrole in the years leading up to 1829 
(Source: MEPO 4/508, National Archives London). Only 156 men were hired into Bow Street between 1823 and 
1829.  Since turnover is high in the early years, this 156 only corresponds to hires and not the existing level of pre-
Met ‘police’. We can observe (using names) that a number were hired by the Met in the initial hiring wave; 24 of 
the last 34 Bow Street hires pre-Met subsequently joined the Met, but 9 were already dismissed by May 1830 and 
a number of others soon after.   
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“[…] offences against property have of late increased in and near the metropolis; and the local 
establishments of nightly watch and nightly police have been found inadequate to the prevention 
and detection of crime, by reason of the frequent unfitness of the individuals employed, the 
insufficiency of their number, the limited sphere of their authority, and their want of connection 
and co-operation with each other […]” 
 
But, anecdotal evidence also points towards alternative reasons for forming the Met, including 
a need for a centralized (non-military) body to maintain order, police provision independent of 
parish wealth, and a desire for order and tidiness.21 The first of Sir Robert Peel’s nine Principles 
of Law Enforcement highlights these alternative reasons: “The basic mission for which police 
exist is to prevent crime and disorder as an alternative to the repression of crime and disorder 
by military force and severity of legal punishment.”22  
 
2.2. The Roll-out of Professional Police Forces Across England and Wales 
Professional forces were subsequently introduced in counties and boroughs throughout England 
and Wales via three acts: The 1835 Municipal Corporations Act, the County Police Act of 1839 
(or 1839 Rural Constabulary Act) and the County and Borough Police Act of 1856.  
The 1835 Act required the boroughs to appoint both a watch committee and sufficient 
number of fit men to act as constables, tasked with preserving the peace and preventing crime. 
There was general resistance, such that by 1837 only 93 of 171 boroughs even claimed to have 
established a force (Hart, 1955). Many admitted to fulfilling ‘statutory obligations’ by re-
appointing previous ‘police’ (rather than selecting new recruits; Hart, 1955). Rather than 
studying the limited and fuzzy implementation of the 1835 Act, we focus on the rural county 
forces created by the 1839 and 1856 Acts.  
The 1839 Act gave the Quarter Sessions’ justices in each county the power to create a 
police force for all or part of the county if they chose. This act also provided guidance regarding 
the structure of such a force (Stallion and Wall, 1999), including a pay scale set by the Home 
Office.23 Why were the 1835 and 1839 Acts passed? Hart (1955) argues that these acts were 
not a response to criminals fleeing already treated areas, a conclusion that our analysis of 
spillovers from London to the neighboring counties supports. Rather, she argues that an 
increased concern about relying on the military and deficiencies in the implementations of 
 
21 See http://www.open.ac.uk/Arts/history-from-police-archives/Met6Kt/MetHistory/mhFormMetPol.html (last 
accessed on May 17, 2018). 
22 The military had a limited pre-Met role, not extending to patrolling the streets in the sense of everyday policing. 
In particular, they were sent in to dissolve unlawful gatherings or to (violently) suppress riots (Dell, 2004).  
23 A county constable should be paid somewhat more than an agricultural worker. Last accessed October 22, 2018, 
see https://www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/History%20of%20Police%20Office%20Pay%20Framework.pdf,. 
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earlier acts motivated the 1839, and ultimately, 1856 Acts (Hart, 1956). 
The 1856 Act consisted of four main features. First, at the next General or Quarter 
Sessions after December 1, 1856, a police force had to be established in every borough or 
county without an existing one. Second, all forces (new and old) had to be ‘efficient’, largely 
defined as being sufficiently large relative to the population size. Third, an Inspectorate of 
Constabulary was created to annually inspect and certify ‘efficiency’ for all forces, introducing 
a large measure of centralization to local policing. Fourth, clothing for constables and 25% of 
wages would be paid by the Treasury upon certification (Hart, 1956).    
In 1856, three inspection districts – Northern, Midlands, and Southern – were formed, 
each with an assigned inspector. According to Cowley and Todd (2006), the initial (unofficial) 
inspections in 1857 found many counties with inefficient or even non-existent forces. The 
inspectors assessed efficiency according to (i) the size of the force, (ii) the ratio of officers to 
the population, (iii) the quality of supervision, and (iv) the degree of cooperation with 
neighboring forces. Stipulated by the 1839 Act, one officer per 1,000 people was taken as the 
norm by the inspectors. Following unofficial advice given during the preliminary inspections 
in early 1857, only five districts were declared inefficient in the first official inspection, but just 
one (Rutland) the following year (Cowley and Todd, 2006).24 The Inspectors rigidly interpreted 
the requirement of a sufficient ratio of officers per population; even the Home Secretary, Sir 
Vernon Harcourt, highlighted this in 1883: “…the fanciful cast-iron rule of so many 
[police]men per 1,000 inhabitants. Nothing can be more ridiculous than to apply the same 
measure to all places alike regardless of circumstances.”   
  
3. The London Metropolitan Police Force (1829) and Crime  
3.1. London Data Description 
Our London analysis necessitates geocoded historical crime data to identify crimes in the 
treated and control areas. We use two data sources with respective advantages and limitations.  
The first is the Proceedings of the Old Bailey. The Old Bailey is the Central Criminal 
Court of London and the surrounding county of Middlesex, and responsible for all felony trials. 
The Proceedings were published after each monthly court session and include the records of 
more than 200,000 trials from 1700 to 1913; these have since been digitized by The Old Bailey 
Proceedings Online. Though many variables (e.g. offense type, verdict, and sentence) are 
tagged and easily identifiable, we also manually extracted and coded the location and date of 
 
24 Rutland remained inefficient until the 1861/62 inspection year. 
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the crime as well as the characteristics of police witnesses (number, type, and crime scene 
presence), which we will use to assess the first-stage implementation of the Metropolitan Police 
Act.25 Given the time-intensive nature of the transcription and historical geocoding, we focus 
on the most serious offenses of murder/manslaughter, robbery, and burglary/housebreaking 
from 1821 to 1837.26  For these, we can assume that their felony status (and hence representation 
at the Old Bailey versus a lesser court) did not change. Importantly, the emphasis on the most 
serious offenses further alleviates concerns regarding changes in crime reporting following the 
introduction of the Met - i.e. a robbery would always be reported. 
To geocode the data, a research assistant transcribed the most detailed address available 
in the Proceedings (e.g. an intersection, parish/district name or street end/mid points) and 
mapped these locations into modern day London maps to obtain postcodes and geo-
coordinates.27 Using the geocoded location and date of offense, we classify offenses as in the 
treatment and control areas (within/outside a 7-mile radius of Charing Cross and within/outside 
the City of London, respectively) before and after the Met’s introduction. Thus, with the Old 
Bailey data, we can estimate both simple pre-post and difference-in-differences specifications.  
 Figure 4 shows maps of each crime for 1821 – September 1829 (pre-Met) and October 
1829 – 1837 (post-Met). Each dot represents the location for a defendant-crime observation; 
treated locations are blue, while control locations (the City of London or outside 7-miles) are 
green. The borders indicate modern date postcode areas and the red circles indicate radii of 7 
and 15 miles from Charing Cross, respectively.28 Appendix Table A2 provides the number of 
trials by crime type as well as details regarding police witnesses within and outside a 7-mile 
radius of Charing Cross and in the City of London for different time windows. One statistic that 
stands out is the relatively low number of murder/manslaughter trials (just 258 in all areas over 
1821-1837). Appendix Figure 1 demonstrates that this low murder rate is not driven by only 
 
25 We have previously used the Old Bailey data in projects studying (i) the impact of abolishing the death penalty 
on jury verdicts, (ii) path dependency in jury decisions, and (iii) the gender gap in jury and judge decisions from 
1715 to 1900 (see Bindler and Hjalmarsson, 2017, 2018 and forthcoming). 
26 We have also geocoded robbery, burglary, and murder/manslaughter for the longer period of 1820 to 1850, but 
focus on this shorter window to avoid the 1837 abolition of the death penalty for robbery and burglary. In addition, 
after the initial data coding, we noted an unusual dip in burglary from the mid-1820s to the mid-1830s. There were 
hardly any offenses labelled as burglary during this time, while there was a sharp increase in the offenses labelled 
housebreaking. We therefore geocoded housebreaking offenses for the 1820-1837 window to supplement our 
analysis. Housebreaking and burglary are treated as one combined offense category for the entire period. 
27 The same RA coded all locations, and though they were aware of the general question, they were unaware of 
the specifics of the research design. There was no opportunity for manipulation in the geocoding. Whenever 
locations have changed names (e.g. street names), we identify the current address using historical maps (roughly 
40% of our regression sample). When the most detailed address is a long street (about 11% of our sample), we 
geocode the nearest street endpoint as the location (i.e., assign potentially untreated observations to the treatment 
area). Results are qualitatively robust to excluding either of those ‘fuzzy’ locations (see Appendix Table A3). 
28 Shapefiles for the postcode areas were obtained from Maproom’s UK Postcodes Shapefiles. 
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measuring crimes that go to trial; Old Bailey murder trials track well with an alternative time 
series of London homicides that is not based on trials. A more likely explanation is the limited 
ability of coroners at this time to identify potential murders (Emmerichs, 2001).  
The limitation of the Old Bailey data only including serious felonies that go to trial is 
addressed by our second data source – the Report or Account of the Proceedings at the several 
Police Offices. These are reports by the nine police offices that were run by the pre-1829 
magistrates, which continued until 1839.29 We manually transcribed the data from January to 
April of 1828 (the year pre-reform), 1830 (the year post-reform) as well as 1831 and 1832. 
Unfortunately, these daily police reports did not exist before 1828 and those for the second half 
of 1828 and 1829 are missing.30 For each office and day (except Sundays), a detailed description 
of ‘charges’, ‘informations’ and ‘property stolen’ are reported. We use these data to create two 
measures of crime incidence: (i) the daily number of ‘property stolen’ entries and (ii) the daily 
number of property, violent, and other ‘informations’.  Most comparable to modern day arrest 
data, we also code the daily number of charges by crime category (property, violent, other). Our 
interpretation of these different measures is that daily informations and stolen property reports 
represent uncleared crime incidents while charges represent cleared crime incidents. To address 
the possibility that the introduction of police simply shifts uncleared crimes into the cleared 
category, we also create a measure that aggregates all types of incidents.    
In contrast to the Old Bailey trial data, the daily report data include both felonies and 
misdemeanors and cleared and uncleared crimes (even those not going to trial). Yet, we cannot 
geocode the offenses into treated and control areas of London (the magistrates deal with all of 
London) and are thus restricted to a pre-post design. Given the high frequency of the data, we 
can, however, estimate the total effect on crime in London (the sum of any crime reduction and 
potential counteracting displacement to control areas) in a narrow window around the reform.  
 
3.2. Analysis of The Old Bailey Proceedings  
Evidence of the Introduction of the Metropolitan Police (Old Bailey Data) 
We begin by assessing whether there is evidence of the introduction of the Met in the Old Bailey 
trial reports. Police witnesses were called constables (both before and after the creation of the 
Met), policeman (a post-Met label), watchman (a pre-Met label) and a handful of other labels 
 
29 See Appendix Figure B1 for an example page of data, which are publicly available from the National Archives. 
30 The files for the second half of 1828 as well as for 1829 have, according to information on the website of the 
National Archives, been lost. We therefore coded data from the documents corresponding to the months of January 
until April for the years 1828 (MEPO 4/12), 1830 (MEPO 4/13), 1831 (MEPO 4/15) and 1832 (MEPO 4/17).  
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that were either predominantly pre or post-Met.31 Do we see an increase in the number and/or 
these different types of police witnesses at trial after the Met was created? An important caveat 
is that this analysis conditions on crimes brought to trial: We cannot control for the possibility 
that the new police affect the number of crimes committed or the likelihood of a trial. 
Panel A of Figure 5 plots the annual share of trials with a police witness of any sort for 
both the treated (i.e. within 7-miles but not the City of London) and potential control area 
(outside 7-miles or in the City of London). There is no obvious change in the proportion of 
trials with any police witness around the 1829 introduction of the Met. Panel B presents the 
share of trials in the treated and control areas with different types of police witnesses. 32  In the 
treated area, the share of trials with an ‘old’ labelled witness (watchman or other) drops sharply 
from about 70% to 20% while the share with a ‘new’ label (policeman or other) increased from 
0% to almost 50%. In the control areas, we also see an increase in the share with ‘new’ police, 
but it is much smaller and more gradual than in the treatment area.  
To account for the different sample sizes (and precision) in the different areas (see Panel 
C of Figure 5, which looks at the number rather than share of trials), as well as the potentially 
different composition of offenses, Table 1 looks at the ‘first-stage’ more formally by estimating 
pre-post designs for each potential treatment and control area. We divide the treatment area into 
two areas (within 4 miles and 4-7 miles from Charing Cross) to allow for a potentially more 
intense treatment in the inner divisions (i.e. more visible patrol presence as highlighted in 
Section 2.1). The two control areas include (i) offenses outside the 7-mile area and (ii) the City 
of London. These are simple regressions of each measure of police presence at crime trial i for 
offense o in area a at date t on a dummy indicating whether the offense occurred after the 
introduction of the Met and offense type fixed effects. These results are presented for two 
windows –1821-1837 and 1828-1832 – which we carry through the Old Bailey analysis. The 
latter mimics the estimation window of our second data source (daily police reports). 
Consistent with the descriptive figure, Table 1 shows little evidence that the creation of 
the Met increased the presence of any police at a trial. But, it significantly changed the type of 
witness: The pre-post specifications show that the likelihood of a trial having a ‘new’ police 
witness increased by 57 and 46 percentage points in the 4 and 4-7 miles radius areas, 
respectively (using the 1821-37 window) while the presence of ‘old’ police decreased by 49 
 
31 Other predominantly pre-Met labels include beadle, conductor, marshalsman, officer, patrol and street keeper. 
Other predominantly post-Met labels include inspector, sergeant, superintendent, captain and Thames. 
32 Type of the police witness refers to any of the first five police witnesses; less than 1% of sample trials have more 
witnesses. The presence of constables, a label that is not distinctively pre- or post-Met, is excluded from this figure. 
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and 25 percentage points respectively. Thus, the pre-post analysis confirms that there was a 
treatment, and suggests it may have been stronger in the inner (4-mile) circle. Also consistent 
with the figure, the pre-post specification for the control area (more than 7-miles) indicates 
some increase (16 percentage points) in ‘new’ but no change in ‘old’ police. In the City of 
London, potentially treated after April 1832, a shift from old to new police is seen in the larger 
window (including post-1832) but is much smaller and/or insignificant in the shorter window.   
 Finally, as the Met officers were constantly walking a short beat, it is plausible they were 
increasingly present at the crime scene itself, either by witnessing the crime or being close 
enough to be called for assistance, i.e. a shorter response time. This may depend on crime type 
and be especially relevant for street crimes. Columns (7) and (8) of Table 1 look at this in the 
pre-post regressions: There is a significant 8 percentage point increase in police presence at a 
crime scene in the 4-mile radius for the larger sample period (the estimate is similar but less 
precise for the uncertainty 4-7 mile area, while there is no such effect in the control areas). 
These changes are not seen, however, in the short time window.  
Though substantially smaller than for the treated area, the above analysis finds some 
evidence of an increase in new police in the control areas. Why? There are a number of plausible 
explanations. It could simply be (i) measurement error in our geocoding or (ii) that the term 
‘police’ is increasingly used in the Proceedings by court reporters, regardless of the actual type 
of police (the same court reporter is responsible for the entire Proceedings, regardless of offense 
location). Alternatively, (iii) there could be spill-overs of the Metropolitan Police into the 
control areas. This could occur because the 7-mile radius/City of London is not a perfect 
boundary and some Met police actually patrol this area or some crimes committed outside the 
7-mile radius or in the City led to arrests within the 7-mile radius. If such spill-overs existed 
and the control group was partially treated, we would under-estimate the treatment effect in a 
difference-in-differences analysis of the effect of the Met on crime. To assess the plausibility 
of such spill-overs, Figure 6 presents kernel densities of post-Met trials with and without police 
at the crime scene (Panel A) and with at least one new or one old type of police witness (Panel 
B), both by distance from Charing Cross. If there were no spill-overs, then one would expect to 
see a drop in the density just after the 7- mile threshold. The figures do not suggest a substantial 
spill-over of Metropolitan policing (the densities are close to zero around and outside the 7-
mile mark), but they do reinforce the basic findings from this section. The new police are 
observed to be present in the treated area, and to a greater extent in the 4-mile radius than the 4 
to 7-mile radius. Police are also more likely to be present at the crime scene in the 4-mile radius. 
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Pre-Post Comparison of Means (Old Bailey Data) 
Having established that the creation of the Met affected ‘policing’ in London, we turn to 
whether it affected crime. To do so, we have to temporally and geographically aggregate the 
data. In our baseline, we aggregate at the month by area level: treated (less than 4 miles from 
Charing Cross), uncertain (4 to 7 miles from Charing Cross) and control areas (more than 7 
miles from Charing Cross plus the City of London). Table 2 compares the average number of 
crimes overall and by crime type (burglary, robbery and homicide) before and after introducing 
the Met. Panels A and B show means for 1821-1837 and 1828-1832, respectively.33 In the larger 
window, there is a significant reduction of 12% (8.24 to 7.29) in the average number of total 
monthly crimes in the treated area; there are similar reductions (20%) in the shorter window. 
This change is driven in both windows by robbery, which decreases by 44% and 53%, 
respectively. Such a decrease is not seen in the less intensively treated uncertainty area (if 
anything, there is a significant increase in burglaries in the longer window). No significant 
changes are observed in the control area or the City of London in the short window, though a 
significant increase in robbery is seen in the control and an increase (decrease) in burglary 
(robbery) in the City in the longer window.34 Appendix Figure A2 takes these differences in 
means a step further, and plots them separately for each one-mile radius from Charing Cross. 
The only evidence of a crime reduction is for robbery within the treated area. 
 
Main Empirical Specification (Old Bailey Data) 
To make the case that these post-Met crime reductions in the treated area have a causal 
interpretation, we turn to the difference-in-differences model in equation (1), which uses the 
area outside the 7-mile radius and the City of London as the best possible control groups. We 
again split the potentially treated areas into areas with a certain (within 4-mile radius) and an 
uncertain treatment intensity (4 to 7-mile radius), consistent with the higher treatment intensity 
in the inner circle and suggestive evidence from the difference-in-means comparison above. 
The outcome variable is the number of trials overall and for offense o in area a during time 
period t. The baseline analysis aggregates the data at the month (t) and area (a) level, using the 
four previously defined areas (treatment, uncertain, control and City of London). We later 
conduct robustness tests to alternative aggregation levels (weeks and circles around Charing 
Cross). Year, month and area fixed effects are included.  
 
 
33 Significance levels are based on simple pre-post regressions; the results are robust to including month dummies. 
34 Similar results are found when using an 8-mile instead of a 7-mile radius from Charing Cross. 
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Intuitively, we estimate the change in crime in the treated areas before and after the introduction 
of the Met compared to the change in crime in the control areas. Compared to the simple pre-
post analyses, this allows us to account for general trends in crime that would have occurred 
independently of the reform. For this to be the case, the usual parallel trend assumption must 
hold and we must assume that during the estimation window nothing else changed in the 
treatment but not in the control group (or vice versa) that could have affected crime rates. We 
formally test for pre-reform differences between the treatment and control areas when we move 
from the difference-in-differences to an event-study design and discuss potential confounders.35 
 
Spillovers, Crime Displacement and Other Potential Confounders (Old-Bailey Data) 
Are there potential confounders? We discuss five potential concerns. One obvious 
candidate is the City Day Police which became operational in the City of London in April 1832. 
It is possible that the City Day Police introduced a similar treatment to the City of London as 
the Met did to the treatment area. Thus, part of our control group (City of London) was partially 
treated in 1832 which (if anything) leads to a downwards bias in the estimated treatment effect. 
Nonetheless, we show that our results are robust to either re-allocating the City of London to 
the treatment group after April 1832, the uncertainty group, or dropping it completely.  
A second potential confounder is the first cholera epidemic of 1832, to which the deaths 
of almost 7,000 in London have been attributed.36 The epidemic could certainly have affected 
crime through multiple channels: directly through public riots (Tynkynnen, 1995), by affecting 
police resources (directly through ill/dying officers or indirectly as officers responsibilities are 
shifted away from crime prevention), or by impacting the population of criminals (who may be 
incapacitated by the disease or driven to commit crimes). If the epidemic differentially impacted 
the population in the treatment and control areas, then this could violate the difference-in-
differences assumptions. To explicitly look at the geographical and temporal distribution of 
cholera in London, we use a new source of data - the Returns to Death of the Metropolitan 
Police officers from 1829 to 1889, which provides the date of death, police division to which 
the officer is assigned and often the reason of death. Appendix Figure A3 demonstrates that 
cholera arrived and peaked in 1832, diminished by 1833, and almost disappeared by 1834. 19 
 
35 Robust standard errors are used in the baseline. Appendix Table A4 assesses the sensitivity of these standard 
errors to a wild cluster bootstrap clustering by area (treatment, uncertainly, control, and City): if anything, the 
findings become more precise. 
36 See for instance https://www.choleraandthethames.co.uk/ (accessed April 29, 2019). 
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officers died from cholera, and all but one of these deaths were in July-September (peaking in 
August). Despite the equal number of officers across divisions, deaths were not equally 
distributed, with more deaths in inner London. However, our shorter estimation window mostly 
avoids this concern; in addition, our results are robust to further dropping all trials after May 
1832, i.e. when only looking at the pre-cholera period. Moreover, while the differential 
exposure of the treated and control areas to the cholera epidemic raises the possibility of a 
violation of the parallel-trends assumption, empirically we do not find this to be the case: Event-
study specifications with leads and lags (presented later in this section) suggest parallel pre-
trends in crime and hence support the assumption of no differential trends in crime.  
Third, is there the possibility of other (potentially relevant) criminal justice changes 
during this period that differentially affect the treatment and control areas? The main reform 
we are aware of is the abolition of capital punishment for burglary and robbery in 1837, which 
we avoid by restricting our large time window to end before 1837. Again, the shorter time 
window limits the possibility of omitting other such shocks. Moreover, our previous research 
(Bindler and Hjalmarsson, 2018), studying the effect of abolishing capital punishment on jury 
verdicts, documents that there are no anticipation effects related to the timing of the abolition 
of capital punishment. The abolition occurred offense by offense over a period of 40 years, with 
no crime-specific movements determining the year a specific category was reformed. 
A fourth potential confounder is that the period is characterized by dynamic population 
growth. Appendix Figure A4 shows decadal population estimates and growth for Inner London 
(excluding the City), Outer London and the City of London.37 In the first half of the 19th century, 
Inner London grows at the highest rate (almost 25%) between each census, with Outer London 
not too far off (though the Inner London population is substantially larger), while the City of 
London does not grow at all. To the extent that population growth implies more potential 
criminals and increases in crime, this would bias us against finding a crime-reducing effect in 
the pre-post analysis. Likewise, the faster growth in the treated areas would bias us against 
finding a crime-reducing effect of the Met in a difference-in-difference analysis. However, the 
extent to which such differential population growth is a concern is again mitigated by our 
emphasis on the short window around the reform and by observing parallel pre-trends in crime. 
Finally, to determine whether the introduction of professional police decreased crime 
overall or just locally (where police were introduced), one needs to understand whether police 
spill-over or crime displacement effects exist. Our above discussion of witnesses already raised 
 
37 The classification of Inner and Outer London areas is done by the historical census, but these are likely to overlap 
with our less than and greater than 7-mile radius classifications. 
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the possibility of the former. Though it would actually attenuate our estimates of a crime 
reducing effect of police, we concluded that there was little evidence of a substantial police 
spill-over. With regards to crime displacement, if criminals chose to commit crime in less 
policed areas than the newly treated Met jurisdiction, this would bias the difference-in-
differences estimates in the direction of a crime reducing effect. One could even conclude crime 
was reduced even if all crimes from the treated area were simply re-located to the control area. 
To assess the extent to which displacement is a concern, we return to the pre-post estimations 
in Table 2. There is no evidence of an increase in crime in control areas in the short window. A 
spill-over cannot be ruled out in the longer window, however, as the average number of monthly 
robberies outside the 7-mile radius actually doubles, though it is still an order of magnitude 
smaller than in the treated area. To take a closer look at potential displacement, Figure 6 plots 
kernel densities of crime locations (relative to Charing Cross) for the periods before and after 
the introduction of the Met. If there is displacement, one would expect an increase in the post-
reform density just outside the 7-mile radius, where the Met was not introduced. While one can 
in fact see such a ‘blip’ for each crime category around this distance, we highlight that (i) it is 
negligible relative to the amount of crime in the treated area and (ii) similar blips are seen in 
the pre-Met period, suggesting it is not completely driven by displacement.38  
 
Main Results and Robustness Tests (Old-Bailey Data) 
The results from the difference-in-differences estimation are shown in Table 3. Columns 
(1) to (3) correspond to the baseline specification (with the City of London classified as a 
control area) for three windows: 1821-1837, 1825-1835, and 1828-1832. Panel A shows the 
results for total crime, and Panels B to D separately by crime type. Using the largest window, 
we find that the introduction of the Met leads to highly significant decreases in trials in the 
treatment relative to the control area for total crime, which is driven by robbery. The baseline 
effects are sizeable: Relative to the average number of pre-Met crimes in the treatment group, 
the point estimates (in the larger window) translate into a reduction in combined crime of 14% 
and 40% for robbery. Though at least partially treated, we do not find any effects of the Met on 
crime in the uncertainty area; this could imply that there was no change in crime levels in the 
uncertainty area (maybe due to a smaller deterrence effect as police were less visible in larger 
 
38 In this period, criminals would likely be travelling on foot. Horse drawn stage coaches could be hired, and from 
1829, the first ‘omnibuses’ were introduced in central London (horse-drawn buses), but these alternatives were 
expensive. See https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/static/Transport.jsp, last accessed June 19, 2018, and Heblich et 
al. (2018). In this context, the control area with a radius of 7 to 15 miles from Charing Cross is not small. 
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divisions) or that the crime reduction effect was offset by increased apprehensions.  
Focusing on the inner 4-mile radius, we note that the difference-in-differences estimates 
are close to the simple pre-post comparison of means. Further, moving to a narrower estimation 
window (and mitigating potential confounders), the difference-in-differences specification 
yields similarly sized effects (18% overall and 46% for robbery, respectively). The remaining 
columns of Table 3 show the sensitivity of the main results to alternatively assigning the City 
of London to the treatment group after the introduction of the City Day Police in April 1832, 
the uncertainty group, and excluding the City of London from the analysis completely. 
Unsurprisingly (as the treatment is distorted), the former attenuates the point estimates (though 
they remain significant), while the latter cases result in robbery point estimates only marginally 
different from the baseline. Our main finding that the Met led to significant and sizeable 
reductions in robbery (trials) is robust to alternative estimation strategies and windows. 
Figure 7 shows the results from event study estimations by crime type (burglary – Panel 
A, robbery – Panel B, and homicide – Panel C) for the treated and uncertain areas in columns 
(1) and (2) respectively. We estimate a more flexible specification that interacts the treatment 
and uncertainty indicator with dummies for 2-year intervals before and after the introduction of 
the Met. To account for the mid-year timing of the Met’s creation, we define a year from 
September to August. The purpose of these specifications is twofold: Use the leads to test the 
plausibility of the parallel trends assumption and study the dynamic effects of creating the Met. 
Were the effects immediate, and did they change over time (as officer quality increased with 
both experience and in recruiting)? The results are supportive of parallel trends for all crime 
categories, and for both treatment and uncertainty areas: The coefficients are not significantly 
different from zero in the years leading up to the reform. There is no evidence of a short or 
long-run effect for homicide or burglary. For robbery, the effect is immediate and persistent. 
Table 4 presents robustness checks of the level of temporal and geographic aggregation. 
Columns (1) - (3) aggregate the data to the week by area level (i.e. a smaller temporal period) 
while (4) - (6) consider the month by 1-mile distance band level (i.e. smaller geographic areas). 
Since crime is a rarer event in these smaller units, we adopt an extensive margin measure of 
crime (any crime) for this table; we cannot use the same margin in the baseline aggregation due 
to a lack of variation (100% of treated areas have, on average, at least one crime per month).  
We see the same pattern of results. A significant reduction in robbery trials (ranging from 11.5-
16.8 percentage points) is seen after introducing the Met regardless of the window or level of 
aggregation. In contrast to the baseline, we do observe a sometimes significant reduction in the 
chance of burglary of 6-9 percentage points; precision is generally lost in the smallest window. 
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Finally, Appendix Table A3 demonstrates the robustness of the baseline results to a series 
of sensitivity tests, including: (i) baseline area specific time trends, (ii) excluding crimes 
reported to be ‘somewhere’ on a long street, which could lead to crimes being miss-classified 
as treated offenses given our geocoding strategy, (iii) including only crimes for which we could 
identify the coordinates without having to refer to historical maps, and (iv) excluding offenses 
with missing crime dates (rather than instead assigning trial dates, as in the baseline).  
 
3.3. Analysis of The Daily Police Reports 
Summary Statistics (Daily Police Reports)  
The second part of the London analysis uses a simple pre-post design to analyze the daily crime 
reports described in Section 3.1. Though the raw data include nine offices, we exclude the 
Thames Police Office from the analysis as the Thames River Police are not in the jurisdiction 
of the Met and the composition and nature of crimes in the Thames jurisdiction (docks and 
water) is likely to differ from the surrounding offices.39 Table 5 presents summary statistics for 
the remaining eight offices for the entire period, the pre-reform period (1828), a one-year post 
period (1830) and a three-year post period (1830-1832). For the entire period, there are on 
average 0.5 informations, 6.4 charges and 0.4 reports of stolen property per day and station. To 
the extent that informations and stolen property reports proxy for uncleared crimes while 
charges represent cleared crimes, the combined total of infomations, stolen property reports and 
charges can be interpreted as the total number of crimes (presented in the top panel of Table 5): 
there are on average 7.3 crime reports per day and station. The largest share of informations 
and charges is for property crimes. ‘Other’ informations include non-crime incidents such as 
escaped prisoners or lost and found reports, while the property and violent categories refer to 
actual crimes. Looking at the total number of crimes across years (1828 versus 1830), we see a 
reduction in the average number of violent crimes of 40%, which persists until 1832, but a small 
increase in property crimes (8%) and other crimes (4%). These increases are driven, however, 
by increases in the number of charges (cleared crimes), while there are decreases in uncleared 
crimes – stolen property reports (25%), property informations (31%), other informations (52%). 
Figure 8 illustrates these patterns: Panel A shows the weekly (Monday–Saturday) number 
 
39 We also exclude the “Metropolitan Police Office” as this office was created only in April 1831. This is only a 
relevant restriction for the larger estimation window; most of the analysis focuses on 1828-1830. As in the Old 
Bailey analysis, a relevant question is the possibility of crime displacement. The jurisdiction of the magistrates in 
the police offices includes all of London, which implies that we capture the total effect (including displaced crime, 
if it existed). Moreover, it is not the case that crimes in the Met jurisdiction were displaced to the Thames office; 
a pre-post analysis of the Thames office indicates a reduction in all crime measures in the first year after the Met 
introduction and the baseline results are robust to including the Thames in the analysis (available on request). 
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of crime incidents (all measures combined) by crime category, while Panels B-D show each 
component separately. As suggested by the summary statistics, there is an overall decrease in 
informations and stolen property reports and an increase in charges after the introduction of the 
Met. The figures do not suggest that this is purely due to crime trends over time: we do not see 
continued decreases or increases in the years after the reform (1830-1832).  
 
Main Empirical Specification and Results (Daily Police Reports) 
Equation (2) presents the baseline pre-post model used to estimate the effect of the introduction 
of the Metropolitan Police on daily crime reported to the different police offices: 
 
(2)    ?<@AB = C12&/3./<@A + ;@ + ;A + ;B + ><@AB 
 
The dependent variable, Y, is the daily measure of crime in year y, calendar week w and day of 
the week d as reported by office i. Our main variable of interest, PostMet, equals one in the 
years following the introduction of the Metropolitan Police (i.e. 1830 to 1832) and zero in the 
year before (i.e. 1828). Our baseline specification includes police office fixed effects to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity across different areas in London as well as fixed effects for 
calendar weeks and day of the week to control for seasonal patterns and variation in crime rates 
over the days of a week. Of course, in a pre-post model, one may remain concerned about 
confounding factors, i.e. other things changing at the same time. To alleviate such concerns, we 
limit the sample period to the year before and after the reform for large parts of this analysis. A 
second concern is that having only one pre-period of data (January to April of 1828) limits our 
ability to say anything about pre-existing trends in crime. But, one argument made for the new 
police was rising crime rates – it would therefore be hard to imagine deterrence being 
confounded by a downward trend in crime. Moreover, the Old Bailey analysis found the results 
to be robust to the smaller time window and both pre-post and difference-in-differences models. 
Table 6 presents the baseline pre-post results using the daily crime reports for each 
outcome: the number of all cleared and uncleared incidents (Panel A), any and number of 
informations (Panels B and C), any stolen property reports (Panel D), and number of charges 
(Panel E). Column (1) shows the raw pre-post difference when the sample is restricted to one 
year before and after the reform only (i.e. 1828 and 1830) including all crime categories. There 
is a significant reduction in the chance of observing any informations by 15 percentage points 
(32% relative to the 1828 mean), the number of informations by 0.302 (38%), and the likelihood 
of any stolen property incidents by 9.8 percentage points (25%). In contrast, there is an increase 
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in the total number of charges by 0.88 (16.6%). Panel A shows that the combined effect on the 
total number of incidents is positive (0.34 or 5.1%) and marginally significant. We build up to 
the baseline specification by adding police office fixed effects in column (2) and calendar week 
and day of the week fixed effects in columns (3) and (4); these have little impact on the raw 
estimates.40 Column (5) includes the daily reports for January to April of two additional post-
reform years (1831 and 1832). For all outcomes, the point estimates increase while their sign 
and precision are unchanged. We study possible reasons for this pattern in Table 7.  
 Columns (6) to (8) of Table 6 look at property, violent and other crimes. Not surprisingly, 
these results are consistent with the comparison of pre- and post-means. For informations, we 
see negative point estimates for all crime categories, with a reduction of any property and 
violent informations of 24% and 57%, respectively. For charges, there is a more heterogeneous 
pattern:  charges increase by about 21% for property crime and decrease by 26% for violent 
crime. The overall effect on crime incidents (Panel A) is such that there is a significant increase 
in property crime (8%) and reduction in violent crime (39%), but no effect on other crime. 
 To interpret these results, one must recall the potential differences between crime 
measures. Both informations and stolen property reports are proxies for criminal incidents when 
there is either no known suspect or the suspect has not been caught: these are uncleared crime 
incidents. For charges, on the other hand, there is always a known suspect in hand – in this 
sense, they are cleared crime incidents. The combined measure of cleared and uncleared 
incidents is our best proxy for total crime incidents. The above analysis finds that the 
introduction of the Met significantly reduced violent crime incidents (both cleared and 
uncleared), but for property crimes, there was a reduction in uncleared but increase in cleared 
offenses, with the magnitude of the latter being larger. That is, for property crime, it appears as 
if the apprehension/clearance effect of the police is greater than the deterrence/incapacitation 
channels. Why? One reason is that the physical presence of the Met officers walking the streets 
may have allowed them to apprehend property offenders, such as pick pocketers, as crimes were 
being committed. Did the police actually deter crimes, or just substitute crimes from the 
uncleared to cleared categories? It is impossible to say for property crime, but the total reduction 
for violent crime suggests that there was at least some true reduction in criminal behavior.41  
 
40 Appendix Table A5 presents a number of robustness checks, including estimates: (i) at the weekly instead of the 
daily level, (ii) excluding incomplete weeks of data, as occur at the beginning of each year or in weeks with 
holidays, (iii) excluding one office at a time to rule out that our results are driven by one particular office, and (iv) 
based on alternative specifications, including logarithms of the dependent variable (where appropriate).  
41 The crime reductions in the daily reports is not driven by a shift in reporting from the old offices to new police 
stations. As discussed earlier, there were no new police stations during this period (except Scotland Yard) and the 
magistrates housed in these offices were responsible for processing crimes both before and after the Met.  
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Extensions: Short- and Medium-Term Dynamics (Daily Police Reports) 
This section aims to better understand the dynamic effects of creating the Met. As described in 
Section 2.1, there were two initial hiring waves, the inner divisions in September 1829 and the 
outer divisions in February 1830.42 We take advantage of this two-stage initial hiring and 
estimate a specification that allows for different coefficients on the treatment variable in (i) 
January 1830 (after the introduction of the Met and before the second hiring wave), (ii) all other 
months in 1830 (after the second hiring wave), (iii) 1831 and (iv) 1832. That is, we estimate 
the baseline specification presented in equation (2), but decompose the treatment into multiple 
time periods. We can thus study the immediate effect of a large hiring wave in February 1830 
(and thereby implicitly allow for heterogeneous effects of the two hiring stages) and whether 
the impact of the formation of the Met changes over time. Table 7 shows the results for the 
combination of all incidents in columns (1) – (3), the number of charges in (4) – (6), any 
informations in (7) – (9), and stolen property reports in column (10). There are two key 
takeaways. First, the point estimates generally increase over time, which may not be surprising 
given the increasing quality of police after the initial introduction of the Met, and the continued 
hiring. Second, while some of the reduction in uncleared crimes is immediate (for violent 
informations and stolen property reports), the significant increase in the clearance (charges) of 
property crimes does not kick in until the second wave. This may mean two things: (i) Visible 
police (notwithstanding low quality) may deter crime even if they do not increase clearance 
rates, and (ii) clearance rates may have been higher already in those places with the first wave 
of hiring than those locations affected by the second hiring wave.  
 
3.4. Summary and Discussion of the London Metropolitan Police Findings 
The first key takeaway of the London Met analyses if that there is convincing evidence of the 
immediate implementation of the Metropolitan Police Act in Old Bailey police witness 
testimony, with the greatest ‘treatment’ in the more intensively patrolled 4-mile radius around 
Charing Cross. Second, using the Old Bailey data, we found that the Met significantly (and 
persistently) reduced robbery trials by about 40% but no evidence of an effect on homicides 
and little evidence for burglary. Given that trials represent cleared crimes, this suggests that the 
crime reducing effects of deterrence and/or incapacitation dominate any apprehension and 
reporting effects for the violent crime of robbery. The lack of a crime-reducing effect for 
burglary at the Old Bailey, however, does not rule out a deterrence effect, as it could be the case 
 
42 There is not, however, a one-to-one mapping of pre-existing police offices to the new Met Police divisions.  
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that a higher clearance rate completely offsets such an effect. Third, our pre-post analysis of the 
daily police report data supports these interpretations of the Old Bailey results: A significant 
reduction in (both cleared and uncleared) violent crimes, including robbery, is observed, while 
evidence of off-setting channels are seen for property crime: a reduction in uncleared crimes 
(which could include deterrence) but increase in cleared crimes. We hesitate to say more than 
that the findings from the two analyses are consistent with each other, or to make direct 
comparisons of the Old Bailey and daily reports analyses: the selected Old Bailey offenses 
represent just a small subset (the most serious) of the wide range offenses in the daily reports. 
Fourth, we find little evidence of spill-overs in policing or crime displacement.  
 
4. The County Police Forces (1839-1856) and Crime 
4.1. County Data 
Our evaluation of the roll-out of county police forces uses manually transcribed archival records 
to measure police force creation and crime. Year of force formation and initial size for each 
county (see Appendix Table A6) were obtained from a Police History Society book (Stallion 
and Wall, 1999). Annual force size data is only available in the Judicial Statistics yearbooks 
after the 1856 mandatory creation of forces. Figure 9 illustrates the roll-out of county forces in 
a map of England and Wales, demonstrating that (i) there is no obvious clustering in the years 
of force creation by neighboring counties and (ii) the earliest reformers are not just those closest 
to London or Middlesex.43 Figure 10 demonstrates the evolution of the number of county forces 
over time: 16 counties created forces in 1840 (just after permission was granted), 2 in 1841, 1 
each in 1843, 1844, 1848, 1851 and 1852, 2 in 1856, and 23 in 1857 (when mandatory).44 
Before the 1856 Act, the only systematic measure of crime that we can collect from the 
Judicial Statistics is the annual number of persons committed or bailed for trial; see Appendix 
Figure B2 for a sample page of data (in one county and year). This measure is available for both 
the entire period and the six main crime categories: class 1 (offenses against persons), class 2 
(offenses against property with violence), class 3 (offenses against property without violence), 
class 4 (malicious offenses against property), class 5 (forgery), and class 6 (other). Appendix 
Table A7 lists the specific offenses included in each class. Our analysis focuses on the total   
number of charges as well as three broad sub-categories: violent (crimes against person and 
 
43 The map’s boundary data are based on the 1851 registration districts of England and Wales and was downloaded 
from https://vision.port.ac.uk/downloads/download_free/boundaries.jsp.  
44 As in the main analysis, these figures exclude York, Sussex, Suffolk and Middlesex counties because forces 
were created for sub-county level areas in different years and crime data are only available for the whole county. 
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violent property offenses), property (non-violent property), and other property crimes 
(malicious property and forgery). We omit the ‘other’ other offenses (class 6), as they vary 
widely by type and severity, making it hard to give them a clear interpretation. 45  
A potential disadvantage of using trials to measure crime is that it may confound changes 
in prosecution behavior (in which the police may have played a significant role at the time) with 
changes in criminal behavior. However, Appendix Figure A5 demonstrates that all three crime 
measures available in the Judicial Statistics after 1857, i.e. trials (our measure), total number 
of indictable crimes committed and the total number of individuals apprehended for indictable 
offenses, move in lock-step until the early 1890s. Another potential concern is the impact of the 
1855 Criminal Justice Act on the number of trials. The Act gave judges the ability to summarily 
deal with larceny cases, which is reflected in the large decrease in the number of trials in the 
year before the mandatory creation of the police forces, specifically for property offenses (see 
Panel A of Figure 11). Given that this Act is a national shock (comparable figures by county 
are available upon request), our difference-in-differences approach mitigates related concerns. 
Moreover, we estimate the effect of creating a force for two categories unaffected by that reform 
(violent and other) and for the early reforming counties using a sample period prior to 1855.  
Finally, we use available census records from 1851 and 1861 to generate relevant control 
variables at the county level: the share male, married, native, in various age groups, unemployed 
or out of the labor force, and farmers.46 We have coded the annual county population from the 
Judicial Statistics after 1857, and use the 1851 and 1841 censuses to estimate the population in 
earlier years.47 We use this population variable to create crime rates. 
 
4.2. Sample Creation, Treatment Definition and Summary Statistics 
We use a difference-in-differences model to estimate the impact of creating rural county police 
forces on crime. We restrict our sample to rural county jurisdictions for which we can both 
reliably identify the year of force creation and measure crime. The raw data include 52 counties; 
we drop Middlesex, York, Sussex and Suffolk, as these counties represent aggregates of regions 
 
45 In 1834, there was a change in the table title from the number of persons committed to the number of persons 
committed or bailed. We therefore demonstrate the robustness of our results to beginning the sample in 1835. 
46 We obtained the census data from North Atlantic Population Project, UK Censuses.  
 https://www.nappdata.org/napp/    
47 For 1851 to 1857, we assign counties the population reported in the 1857 Judicial Statistics (which in turn were 
based on the 1851 Census), and we use the 1841 Census for the years before 1851. Note that the county population 
in the Census includes the entire county population whereas the county population in the Judicial Statistics 
includes the rural areas of the counties only (i.e. the catchment area of the county police force). To use consistent 
measures of population, we thus weight the 1841 Census measures with the share of the rural population as in the 
1851 Census (i.e. the ratio of the county population in the Judicial Statistics compared to the 1851 Census). 
26 
 
with initially separate forces (but with crime data only available at the aggregate level).48  
Consistent with the reporting year for crime data in Judicial Statistics, our main treatment 
variable measures whether county c has a professional force in fiscal year t, ending on 
September 29 of that year. Specifically, we identify whether a county had an existing police 
force for any or all of the fiscal year; for the former, the first treated year is typically only 
partially treated whereas for the latter, the first treated year is fully treated. The above-described 
treatment only captures whether there existed any professional county police force, but nothing 
about the quality of the force. One measure of quality explicitly used by the inspectors tasked 
with annually certifying each force is the relative size of the force, i.e. the number of people per 
officer in the county. We can measure this upon force formation, and use this to characterize 
whether the new force was sufficiently large. Finally, our baseline analysis uses a window of 
eight years before and after the earliest and latest reform years, respectively, i.e. 1832 to 1865, 
but also conduct sensitivity checks with respect to the start and end years of the sample. 
 Table 8 presents summary statistics for all analysis sample counties (N=48) and for those 
characterized as early (1839 or 1840), mid, and late reformers (after the 1856 Act was passed). 
The average number of charges per year (for all counties over the entire time period) is 367, 
which corresponds to 1.79 charges per 1,000 population (1.3 property, 0.3 violent, and 0.06 
other, respectively). 75% of the counties are in England and the average county population was 
close to 200,000 in 1858. It is also clear that the police forces became larger relative to the 
population over time: the ratio of people to police averaged 2,857 at the time of force formation 
but was down to 1,700 by 1858. In terms of characterizing early, mid and late reformers, Table 
8 shows that early reformers were on average largest in terms of population and acreage, while 
the mid-reformers were smallest in both of these measures. In addition, the earliest reformers 
did not have the highest crime rate (based on the whole time period): the average crime rate per 
1,000 population was 1.9 for early reformers, 2.5 for mid-reformers, and 1.5 for late reformers.  
 
4.3. Empirical Approach: County Police Force Formation 
The difference-in-differences model is presented in equation (3): 
 
(3)    D"#E.F( = CG2"9.F( + ;F + ;( + HF(I + >F( 
 
The dependent variable, Crime, is the number of persons committed to trial in county c and 
 
48 Forces were created in East and West Sussex in 1840 and 1857; near the end of 1856 and beginning of 1857 for 
the York sub-parts and 1840 and 1845 for the Suffolk sub-parts. 
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fiscal year t. We consider the log number of both annual county trials and trials per capita, for 
all crimes and by broad crime category. Because of measurement error in the population 
variables, our preferred measure is the number of trials. The primary variable of interest, Force, 
is an indicator equal to one for county-year combinations for which the county had a 
professional force for any or all of the fiscal year. The baseline specification includes county 
(;F) and year (;() fixed effects. The former controls for unobservable but constant differences 
across counties, including pre-existing crime levels which may be related to the decision not to 
create a professional force until it was mandated. County fixed effects further capture any fixed 
characteristics of neighboring counties. The year fixed effects pick up national shocks that 
impact all counties, such as other criminal justice reforms (e.g. offense specific abolition of 
capital punishment, summary judgements for property crimes in 1855, or the 1850s abolition 
of transportation). Standard errors are clustered at the county level. 
For β to represent the causal effect of creating a professional force on crime, we make the 
usual parallel trends assumption that the change in crime (trial) rates in treated counties would 
have been the same as in control counties in the absence of the reform. Panel B of Figure 11 
illustrates the plausibility of this assumption by presenting the average annual log charges 
separately for the early, mid and late reformers. Crime rates are remarkably parallel for these 
three groups. We more formally test the plausibility of the parallel trends assumption in an 
event study design allowing for differential effects leading up to the reform. Another identifying 
assumption is that the timing of police force formation is random. Anecdotally, this seems 
reasonable, at least for the earliest and latest reformers. The earliest reformers created a force 
right after the passage of the 1839 Act, but did not lobby for this Act or know it was coming. 
The last reformers only created a force when they had to after the 1856 Act; again, (to the best 
of our knowledge) they did not know it was coming. We test this assumption in Section 4.5.  
In analyzing the formation of county police forces, the same potential confounders of 
increased reporting and/or clearance rates exist as in London. Using trials to measure crime 
only allows us to estimate the combined effect of deterrence/incapacitation and these 
confounders. Without any measure of uncleared crime incidents, we can only detect a 
deterrence and/or incapacitation effect if it is larger than these offsetting channels: a null or 
increasing effect of police on charges does not rule out the existence of such a crime reducing 
effect, but does not allow us to detect it in the data.  
 
4.4. The Effect of County Police Force Formation on Crime: Results and Robustness  
Table 9 presents the results of estimating the baseline specification for the estimation window 
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1832 to 1865. The dependent variable is the log number of trials in columns (1) and (2) and the 
log number of trials per capita (crime rate) in columns (3) and (4). Panel A considers all charges 
while panels B to D consider violent, property, and other property charges, respectively. The 
variable of interest, Force, is equal to one in any county-year combination in which there exists 
a police force for at least part of the year (columns (1) and (3)) or all of the year (columns (2) 
and (4)), and equal to zero otherwise. The first insight from Table 9 is that the creation of a 
police force, on average, does not have a significant effect on overall, violent, property or other 
crime. Second, the estimates are comparable when using the log number of crimes or the log 
crime rate; going forward, we emphasize the log number given the measurement error concerns 
in the denominator of the crime rate. Third, estimates are comparable when defining treatment 
as having a police force for any or all of the year; going forward, we use the latter (which should 
if anything bias us against finding a crime-reducing effect). 
 The results in Table 9 show the effect of creating any police force, regardless of its quality. 
Yet, some forces may have been in name only or thought to be insufficiently large by the 
inspectors. The lack of an overall effect of force formation on crime could be masking 
differential effects of forces of varying quality. We use the relative size of the force, i.e. the 
number of people per policeman, to assess whether the effect on crime depends on whether the 
force is sufficiently large. In studying that question in an expanded specification, we must rely 
on the added assumption that ‘sufficiently large’ is conditionally random. Though the 1839 Act 
recommended having 1,000 people per policeman, few (if any) forces initially achieved this 
standard. Some initial evidence regarding the determinants (or lack thereof) of force type can 
be seen in Table 8. Simply put, it is not just early reformers (maybe particularly motivated 
counties) that had a sufficiently large force (using a 1,500 threshold); rather, similar proportions 
of early (20%), mid (33%) and late (17%) reformers were sufficiently large at formation. We 
return to the determinants of the relative size of the new forces in the next section.  
Table 10 estimates the impact of sufficiently versus insufficiently large force formation, 
using various thresholds in defining ‘sufficient’, from 1,500 people per policeman in column 
(1) to 2,500 in column (5). Under the strictest and weakest thresholds, there are 10 and 30 
sufficiently large forces, respectively. There is a differential impact of force size: Column (1) 
shows that creating a sufficiently large force with less than 1,500 people per policeman 
decreases the overall number of crimes by approximately 19%; this effect is seen for both 
violent and property crime (18% and 14%, respectively) but not for other offenses. In contrast, 
creating an insufficiently large force does not significantly affect crime overall; instead, it 
(insignificantly) increases the number of property and other crimes. It is the positive effect of 
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such forces on the largest crime category of property offenses that is masking the crime reducing 
effect of creating a sufficiently large force in the baseline regressions. While the crime reducing 
effect of a sufficiently large force gets smaller as we relax the sufficiency threshold in columns 
(2) to (5), we still see an overall reduction in crime.  
 To study the dynamic effects of force creation, we estimate event-study specifications 
where we interact our treatments (creation of sufficiently and insufficiently large forces) with 
dummies for two-year intervals leading up to and following the reform. The omitted category 
is the two years immediately prior to the first fully treated (fiscal) year. The results are shown 
in Figure 12 for all crimes categories combined, and for each offense category separately in 
Appendix Figure A6. The top and bottom panels of Figure 12 present the estimates for the 
sufficiently and insufficiently large forces, respectively; note that both come from the same 
regression. The following conclusions can be drawn: First, the negative effect of sufficiently 
large police force formation on crime is generally not immediate but starts around three years 
after the reform. Second, the crime-reducing effects of sufficiently large forces become larger 
in magnitude over time. Third, for forces that were insufficient in size upon creation, no 
negative effect on crime is seen in any of the eight years after the force is created. These event 
study specifications also provide tests of the plausibility of the parallel trends assumption and 
the ‘random’ timing of force creation: There are no significant differences in crime rates in the 
years leading up to the reform for either (in)sufficiently large forces (neither overall nor by 
crime category). Additional robustness and identification tests are presented in the next section. 
 
4.5. Sensitivity and Identification Tests for County Police Analysis 
Appendix Table A8 presents a sensitivity analysis of our main finding that only the creation of 
a sufficiently large force visibly reduces crime (using the 1,500 threshold). The results are 
robust to (i) controlling for county population, England and inspection region dummies, and 
inspector specific and large county (above median acreage) specific time trends, (ii) reducing 
the sample period by three years on both sides of the window, (iii) breaking the sample into two 
periods: 1832 to 1849 (identified off early reformers) and 1850 to 1865 (identified off late 
reformers), and (iv) restricting the sample to the 36 English counties (excluding Wales).  
We next turn to tests of the identifying assumptions of randomness in (i) the timing of 
force formation and (ii) the relative size of the created force. One potential question is whether 
forces were adopted as a result of crime being displaced from neighboring counties that had 
previously adopted a force. We first look at this directly in the context of the 1829 introduction 
of the London Met: Did this increase crime in the surrounding counties, and trigger force 
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adoption? Though the patterns in Figure 9 suggest otherwise, Appendix Table A9 assesses this 
more formally: Panel A reports pre-post comparisons in mean log charges around the 1829 
introduction of the Met, both for direct neighbors of London/Middlesex and indirect neighbors 
(‘second’ neighbors of London and Middlesex). No clear pattern emerges that would suggest a 
systematic displacement of crime to neighboring counties of London. Moreover, when we 
estimate a regression of log charges on indicators for Middlesex direct and second neighbors 
interacted with a post-1829 dummy (other counties being the reference group), we do not find 
significant increases in crime as a response to the 1829 reform (see Panel B).  
Appendix Table A10 looks more broadly, i.e. for all counties, at the determinants of being 
an early reformer (adopted by 1840) in columns (1)-(6) and the year of adoption for all counties 
in columns (7) – (13). For the latter, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one in the year 
a county creates a force and zero in prior years; counties exit the sample once a force is created, 
as there is no longer a choice to be made.49 We consider the role of: the county’s own lagged 
charge rate, whether the neighboring counties had forces (and their relative sizes), population, 
the lagged charge rate in neighboring counties, and the number of initial police officers in the 
county area who are not part of the county force (measured before the formation of the county 
force and includes previously existing borough police). We find little evidence that these 
variables predict the timing of adoption. The most consistently significant variable is 
population: larger counties were significantly more likely to adopt early, but (i) the point 
estimates are close to zero, (ii) county fixed effects control for larger versus smaller counties, 
and (iii) population does not predict timing for later adopters. Having an insufficiently large 
neighboring force decreases the chance of adoption in a given year, raising the question of 
whether creating a force has spill-over effects on nearby counties, which we address shortly. 
Appendix Table A11 looks at the determinants of initial relative force size: people per 
police and dichotomous variable indicating whether there were less than 1,500 people per 
police. We consider all potential determinants available, including fixed geographic variables 
(acreage, number of parishes and neighboring counties, English vs. Wales), 1851 census 
variables (share farmers, male, married, native, employed, age groups, and population), crime 
rates, and whether any neighboring county had sufficiently or insufficiently large forces in the 
year before force formation.50 There is little information, including crime in the year before 
 
49 This specification is motivated by Buckles et al.’s (2011) and Goldin and Rouse’s (2000) analyses of U.S. state 
reforms of blood test requirements for marriage and the adoption of screens for orchestra auditions, respectively. 
50 These regressions are purely descriptive. There is clearly limited power with a cross-section of 48 counties; 
moreover, force formation could have occurred prior to the measurement of some of these variables (e.g. census). 
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formation, which consistently predicts the type/size of the police force. Moreover, to the extent 
that these variables are constant over time, they are captured by county fixed effects. 
Finally, Table 11 assesses the robustness of our results to spill-over effects of neighboring 
forces. Specifically, we estimate the effect of having an (in)sufficiently large force (using the 
1,500 threshold) while controlling for whether (i) a neighbor in year t (i.e. a border-sharing 
county) had any force or (ii) a neighbor in year t had a sufficient or insufficient force. In all 
specifications, controlling for neighboring county forces has no impact on the baseline 
estimates (though the coefficients on neighboring forces are themselves significant): having a 
sufficiently large force still decreases overall crime by almost 19%. Having a sufficiently large 
neighboring force significantly decreases local violent, property and other crime, while an 
insufficiently large neighboring force increases local property crime. What could explain these 
patterns? There are a number of potential channels (which we unfortunately cannot disentangle) 
through which a relatively large neighboring force can decrease local crime. One possibility is 
cooperation between forces, which to some extent would reflect ‘true’ spillovers in policing. 
This was even a criterion that the inspectors evaluated; to the extent that a large force signals 
high quality, it could also be correlated with a high degree of cooperation. Another possible 
channel is that a large enough neighboring force decreases crime by incapacitating criminals 
who would have committed crimes in multiple counties. With respect to the increase in property 
crime due to a relatively small neighboring force, we can put forward one main channel: this 
small neighboring force does not have the capacity (or cooperative nature) to police criminals 
who commit their crimes elsewhere. That is, offenders may steal in one county but hide from 
the authorities in a neighboring (poorly policed) county. Anecdotal evidence of this is provided 
in the 1839 Police Commissioner’s Report (page 280, paragraph 208): “The state of insecurity 
produced in guarded towns by the unprotected state of surrounding districts is not confined to 
the facilities of escape furnished to delinquents for crimes committed within the towns, but the 
subsistence given in the unprotected districts to the predatory classes who harbor in the towns 
increases the expense of guarding against them.”51  
 
4.6. Discussion of County Police Force Formation Results  
To summarize, the above analysis of the roll-out of professional county forces has four key 
findings. First, the creation of ‘sufficiently large’ county forces reduces trials overall and for 
both violent and property crime. Second, the formation of ‘insufficiently large’ forces does not 
 
51 https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.a0000872473;view=1up;seq=7, last accessed April 28, 2019. 
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have an observable crime (trial) reducing effect. Third, the effect of creating a sufficient force 
is not immediate and increases over time. Fourth, the introduction of the London Met did not 
displace crime to neighboring counties. Fifth, there are spill-over effects of neighboring county 
forces, with an insufficiently (sufficiently) large neighbor increasing (decreasing) ‘local’ crime.  
 What do these findings tell us about why the creation of a county force decreases crime? 
On the one hand, there are two main channels through which crime can be reduced: deterrence 
and incapacitation. On the other hand, creating a police force might increase measures of 
‘crime’ through increased reporting of crime incidents and apprehensions. The net negative 
effect for sufficiently large forces suggests that deterrence and incapacitation outweigh 
reporting and apprehension channels. However, while (anecdotally) the aim of the new forces 
was deterrence, we cannot empirically disentangle it from incapacitation (the same is actually 
true in our London analysis). Finally, the increase in the size of the crime-reducing effect over 
time highlights the importance of quality: Force ‘quality’ clearly improved over time as people 
per officer ratios decreased, supervisors were increasingly hired, and experience was gained.  
 Linked to the notion of quality, what can we conclude about the impact of creating 
relatively small police force? While there is no negative net effect on the number of charges 
brought to trial, we cannot rule out the possibility of deterrence and/or incapacitation. We 
simply cannot disentangle whether there is a null effect because a force had no effect at all or 
because the positive and negative channels off-set each other.  
  
5. Conclusion 
This paper exploits two natural experiments in history – the introduction of the London 
Metropolitan Police in 1829 and the subsequent roll-out of county police forces throughout 
England and Wales – to estimate the effect on crime of the introduction of professional forces, 
which were for the first time explicitly tasked with deterrence. In London, we find evidence 
consistent with a crime-reducing effect, especially for violent crimes (including robbery); for 
property crimes, we find clear evidence of a reduction in uncleared crimes but also an increase 
in cleared crimes. Our county analysis finds that introducing ‘sufficiently large’ police forces 
reduced crime overall and across crime categories, while relatively small forces did not have a 
visible net crime reducing effect.  
 The most comparable studies to ours are those of police deployment and those of 
additional, private police. Using terror-related shocks to deployment, Draca et al. (2011) and 
DiTella and Schargrodsky (2004) find elasticities of crime with respect to police of around -
0.3, i.e. a decrease in crime of approximately 0.3% with a 1% increase in police. MacDonald et 
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al. (2016) study the effect of private police patrols within defined boundaries using a geographic 
regression discontinuity design. They find a 45-85% increase in the number of crimes outside 
of the boundaries of the private police catchment area, which they convert to an elasticity of -
0.33 (-0.2 for property crime and -0.7 for violent crime). Our findings for both the London and 
county analyses are generally in line with these results. Sufficiently large county forces 
decreased rural crime by 19%, while the London Met decreased robbery by 40 to 46%.  
Finally, the county results are based on a sufficiently large force having fewer than 1,500 
people per officer. How does that compare to today’s force sizes? Data from the UCR’s Crime 
in the United States suggest that overall there were 3.5 law enforcement officers per 1,500 
population in the U.S. in 2016 (3.9 for metropolitan areas and 4.5 for non-metropolitan areas, 
respectively).52 Data from Eurostat report similar numbers for 2016 with 3.2 police officers per 
1,500 population in England and Wales (4.5 in Germany and 3.04 in Sweden).53 That is, using 
a ratio of one officer per 1,500 people as a threshold is conservative in today’s terms. 
Lastly, despite the historical setting, our study offers a number of contemporary insights. 
First, the extensive margin effect of the modern-day police institution is in and of itself still a 
relevant question. In countries like the U.S. and U.K., police departments and/or local police 
stations are being closed due to shrinking budgets.54 What will be the effect of these closures 
on crime? The existing literature is limited in its ability to answer this question, as such an 
extrapolation would be based on the assumption that the marginal effects per officer (identified 
in the literature) apply equally (linearly) across officers.55 This assumption (to the best of our 
knowledge) has no empirical support to date. Our study begins to shed light on this question, 
suggesting that the effects are not linear, as a crime reduction effect is not seen for smaller 
forces. This could be because of how tasks are prioritized in forces of different sizes, and how 
the tasks of the marginal officer change. In future work, we aim to shed more light on this 
question in this historical setting: does the marginal effect of police on crime change as these 
new forces began to grow? There are, of course, caveats in making inference to today’s context 
from our study, including the many other institutional and societal differences between 19th 
century England and today and the fact that the (quasi) extensive margin effect may not be 
 
52 https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/tables/table-25, last accessed March 15, 2018. 
53 Eurostat, “Personnel in the criminal justice system by sex” (last accessed on October 31, 2018): 
 https://data.europa.eu/euodp/data/dataset/4IAKUAgPA5yFoNEwJp1syA  
54 See, e.g., https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/us/blandford-police-officers-quit.html for the US and for the 
UK https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/police-station-close-shut-budget-cuts-police-federation-
a8521501.html. 
55 In a recent study, Blesse and Diegmann (2018) exploit variation from police station closures in one federal state 
in Germany to estimate the effect of police closures on crime. 
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symmetric upon creation and collapse of a force. Nevertheless, given the lack of research to 
date on this margin, we believe our study fills a significant gap in the literature.   
Finally, police forces in less developed countries today are being disbanded and new 
forces created in an effort to eliminate police corruption.56 Our results may have important 
policy implications today with respect to institution building in these countries; one potential 
‘lesson’ is that the quality of the institution plays a fundamental role.  
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Figure 1. London Metropolitan Police – Weekly Hires 
Panel A. 1829-1831 
 
Panel B. 1830-1856  
 
NOTES – Panel A shows the weekly number of police joining the Metropolitan Police across all police divisions 
between September 1829 and March 1830. The data underlying this figure were manually transcribed from the 
Register of recruits into the Metropolitan Police available at the London National Archives (MEPO 4/31). Panel 
B shows the weekly number of total police, appointments as well as removals from the Metropolitan Police 
between 1829 (1830 for appointments and removals) and 1857. This figure is based in manually transcribed data 
from the Weekly State of the Metropolitan Police 1829-1857 available at the London National Archives (MEPO 
4/1).  
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Figure 2. The London Metropolitan Police Jurisdiction (1829) 
Panel A. Original Map of the London Metropolitan Police District in 1829 
 
 
Panel B. Police Stations (Existing Before the Metropolitan Police and until 1839) 
 
NOTES – Panel A presents a map of the original London Metropolitan Police District. Shaded in red is the City 
of London Police area, outside of the Met’s jurisdiction. The large letters indicate the various districts of the 
Metropolitan Police. The map is available from the British Library’s online map collection:  
http://www.bl.uk/onlinegallery/onlineex/crace/j/007000000000019u00055000.html. Panel B shows a map of 
London centered on Charing Cross, with the pre-existing police offices indicated by blue squares and 4- (dashed), 
7- and 15-miles radii around Charing Cross in red. The borders represent modern day postcode areas; the shapefiles 
were obtained from Maproom’s UK Postcodes Shapefiles and contain OS, Royal Mail and National Statistics data.
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Figure 3. London Metropolitan Police – Turnover and Quality 
Panel A. Weekly Number of Leavers  
 
Panel B. Weekly Number of Removals, by Reason 
 
Panel C. Weekly Number of Dismissals, by Reason 
 
 
NOTES – Panel A shows the weekly number of leavers from the London Metropolitan Police among those officers 
who were recruited between September 1829 and March 1831. The figure is based on manually transcribed data 
from the Register of recruits into the Metropolitan Police sourced from the London National Archives (MEPO 
4/31). Panel B presents the weekly number of removals from the London Metropolitan Police by broad reason 
(resignation, dismissal, death), Panel C shows the weekly number of dismissals further split up by more detailed 
reason (drunkenness, neglect or misconduct, criminal behavior, other). These figures are based on manually 
transcribed data from the Home Office: Police Entry Books, Series I. Metropolitan Police sourced from the London 
National Archives (HO 65/11, 65/12 and 65/13). 
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Figure 4. Geocoded Data from the Old Bailey Proceedings 
 
NOTES – The figure plots geocoded crime locations of murders, manslaughters, robberies and burglaries trialed at the Old Bailey between 1821 and 1837. The two red circle 
mark a 7- and 15-mile radius from Charing Cross, respectively. Each dot represents a trial-defendant observation; the green dots represent crime locations inside the City of 
London (within 7-mile radius) as well as outside the 7-mile radius and the blue dots represent crime locations within the 7-mile radius and not in the City of London. The borders 
represent modern day postcode areas; the respective shapefiles were obtained from Maproom’s UK Postcodes Shapefiles and contain OS, Royal Mail and National Statistics 
data. 
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Figure 5. Evidence of the Introduction of the Met Police in the Old Bailey Proceedings 
Panel A. Presence of Any Police Witnesses at Trial 
 
Panel B. Change in Type of Police Witnesses at Trial (Share of Trials) 
 
Panel C. Change in Type of Police Witnesses at Trial (Number of Trials) 
 
NOTES – Panel A shows the annual share of homicide, robbery, and burglary trials at the Old Bailey from 1821 
to 1837 with at least one police present as a witness. The black solid line represents trials for crimes located in the 
treatment group (within 7 miles from Charing Cross), the grey dashed line trials for crimes located in the control 
group (more than 7 miles from Charing Cross or in the City of London). Panel B (C) shows the annual share 
(number) of trials that, among the first five witnesses present at the trial, had at least one of either the new type 
(black) or the old type (grey) of police both for the treatment group (solid lines) and the control group (dashed 
lines). See the text for details on the types of police. The red vertical line in all panels represents the timing of the 
introduction of the Metropolitan Police in 1829. The figures are based on data from the Old Bailey Proceedings 
Online and own transcriptions/calculations.  
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Figure 6. Spill-overs in Policing and Crime Displacement 
Panel A. Police at Crime Scene Panel B. New/Old Type Police Witnesses  
  
Panel C. Crime Locations: Total Crime Panel D. Crime Locations: Burglary 
  
Panel E. Crime Locations: Robbery Panel F. Crime Locations: Homicide 
  
 
NOTES – Panel A shows the kernel density of homicide, robbery and burglary trials at the Old Bailey from 1829 
(after the introduction of the Met) to 1837 with/without police at the crime scene by distance from Charing Cross 
(in miles). Panel B shows the respective kernel density for trials with at least one “new” or “old” type police 
witness at the trial (see the text for details on the types of police). Panel C to F show the kernel densities of crime 
locations for trials at the Old Bailey for 1821-1829 (before the introduction of the Met) and 1829-1837 (after the 
introduction of the Met), for all types of crime and separately for burglary, robbery and homicide. All figures 
exclude the City of London. The dashed vertical lines mark the thresholds in terms of distance from Charing Cross 
for the treated, uncertain and control area, respectively. The figures are based on data from the Old Bailey 
Proceedings Online and own transcriptions/calculations.
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Figure 7. Event-Study for Reduced Form from the Old Bailey Proceedings 
Panel A1. Burglary, Treated Panel A2. Burglary, Uncertain  
  
Panel B1. Robbery, Treated  Panel B2. Robbery, Uncertain 
  
Panel C1. Homicide, Treated  Panel C2. Homicide, Uncertain 
  
 
NOTES – The figures show the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals corresponding to the event-
study specifications described in Section 3.2. The figures to the left represent the results for the treated area, the 
figures to the right for the uncertain area (see text for explanations; note that the estimates come from the same 
regression). Panels A1 and A2 show the results for burglary, Panels B1 and B2 for robbery, Panels C1 and C2 for 
homicide. A year is defined as September to August. The vertical line represents the two years before the 
introduction of the Metropolitan Police (September 1829) which is the omitted category. The dashed horizontal 
line represents the (average) diff-in-diff estimate. The figures are based on data from the Old Bailey Proceedings 
Online and own transcriptions/calculations. 
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Figure 8. Daily Crime Reports – Weekly Aggregated Crime 
Panel A. Weekly Number of All Incidents Panel B. Weekly Number of Informations 
  
Panel C. Weekly Number of Charges Panel D. Weekly Number of Property Stolen Incidents 
  
 
NOTES – Panel A shows the weekly number of all incidents (the sum of informations, charges and property stolen 
incidents) for property (black line), violent (blue line) and other (green line) for all London police offices (except 
Thames and the Metropolitan Police, see Section 3.1 for details). Violent and other crimes exclude property stolen 
incidents. Panel B shows the weekly number of informations and Panel C the weekly number of charges, again for 
property, violent and other crime. Panel D shows the weekly number of property stolen incidents. In each panel, 
the red horizontal line represents the date of the introduction of the Metropolitan Police. The figures are based on 
manual transcribed data from the Report or Account of the Proceedings of the several Police Offices sourced from 
the National Archives (MEPO 4/12, 4/13, 4/15 and 4/17).  
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Figure 9. Map of Police Force Start Years for English and Welsh Counties 
 
 
NOTES – The map illustrates the different start years of police forces across counties in England and Wales. Each 
color represents a different start year. The counties of York, Sussex, and Suffolk are excluded (left blank) because 
of multiple start dates for the same county. This map is based on 1851 county registration districts, from Great 
Britain Historical GIS Project (2012) 'Great Britain Historical GIS'. See the text for details on the police force start 
years.
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Figure 10. Number of Professional County Police Forces in England and Wales 
 
NOTES – This figure shows the number of county police forces in each year for our analysis sample of 48 counties, 
i.e. excluding Middlesex, York, Suffolk, and Sussex. The red vertical line marks 1857, the year when the creation 
of a county police force became mandatory. See Section 4.1 and 4.2 for details on the data and the sample. 
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Figure 11. County-Level Data on Charges Brought to Trial  
Panel A. Number of Annual Charges by Crime Type in England and Wales 
 
 
 
Panel B. Average Log Charges for Early, Mid and Late Reforming Counties 
 
 
NOTES – Panel A shows the annual number of charges brought to trial in England and Wales, overall and by 
crime type and for all counties included in the analysis sample, i.e. excluding Middlesex, York, Suffolk, and 
Sussex. The red vertical line marks 1857, the year when the creation of a county police force became mandatory. 
Panel B shows the annual average log charges separately for early, mid and late reformers, again excluding the 
counties of Middlesex, Sussex, York, and Suffolk. The red vertical lines correspond to the earliest and latest years 
of reform implementation (1841 and 1858). The figures are based on data from the Judicial Statistics, see Section 
4.1 and 4.2 for details.
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Figure 12. Event-Study: Sufficiently/Insufficiently Large County Police Forces on Crime 
 
Panel A: Sufficiently Large Police Forces, Log-Level Specification, All Charges 
 
 
 
Panel B: Insufficiently Large Police Forces, Log-Level Specification, All Charges 
 
 
NOTES – The above event-study figures are based on log-level regressions of offenses on sufficiently large 
(ratio<1,500) and insufficiently large (ratio>1,500) force dummies that are interacted with two-year intervals. All 
years eight or more years after police force formation and nine or more years before police force formation are 
combined, respectively. The omitted category is the period 1-2 years before the police force is created, where the 
first year (0) is defined as the first full fiscal year following the creation of a police force. The above figures show 
the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the baseline specification with county and year fixed 
effects. The dots/lines correspond to the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals. The vertical line represents 
the two years before the police force is created (the omitted category). The dashed horizontal line represents the 
(average) diff-in-diff estimate. 
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Table 1. Evidence of the Introduction of the Metropolitan Police: Police Witnesses at the Old Bailey  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Outcome: Any police witness Any "new" police witness Any "old" police witness Police at crime scene 
Sample: 1821-1837 1828-1832 1821-1837 1828-1832 1821-1837 1828-1832 1821-1837 1828-1832 
Panel A. Pre-Post Analysis 
Treated (<4 miles)         
Post Met 0.025 -0.018 0.574*** 0.540*** -0.487*** -0.485*** 0.082*** 0.007 
 (0.018) (0.032) (0.019) (0.034) (0.021) (0.044) (0.021) (0.045) 
Observations 1,586 427 1,586 427 1,586 427 1,586 427 
Uncertain (4-7 miles)         
Post Met 0.034 -0.071 0.455*** 0.357*** -0.254*** -0.133 0.074 -0.092 
 (0.064) (0.145) (0.057) (0.117) (0.082) (0.211) (0.057) (0.187) 
Observations 135 31 135 31 135 31 135 31 
Control (>7 miles)         
Post Met 0.014 -0.007 0.155*** 0.088** -0.056 0.059 -0.005 -0.052 
 (0.052) (0.083) (0.033) (0.038) (0.063) (0.096) (0.038) (0.077) 
Observations 230 89 230 89 230 89 230 89 
City of London         
Post Met -0.062 -0.096 0.268*** 0.113 -0.259*** -0.201* -0.031 -0.156 
 (0.039) (0.059) (0.042) (0.081) (0.056) (0.103) (0.052) (0.103) 
Observations 314 100 314 100 314 100 314 100 
NOTES - The table shows regression results for the first stage outcomes (dummy variables for any police witness at the trial, any "new" police witness, any "old" police witness, 
and whether any police was at the crime scene). Panel A shows pre-post specifications that include offense fixed effects. The regressions are based on data from the Old Bailey 
Proceedings Online and own transcriptions/calculations; the sample includes trials for robbery, burglary and homicide. See Section 3.2 for details. Robust standard errors are 
shown in parentheses below the coefficient. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
50 
 
 
Table 2. Differences in Means in the Old Bailey Proceedings 
    Total   Burglary   Robbery   Homicide 
    Before After △   Before After △   Before After △   Before After △   
                     
Panel A. 1821-1837, Y = Number of crimes per month/area  
Treated  8.24 7.29 -0.95 **  4.81 4.90 0.09   2.59 1.46 -1.13 ***  0.85 0.93 0.08  
Uncertain  0.52 0.81 0.29 **  0.36 0.57 0.21 **  0.11 0.14 0.03   0.06 0.10 0.04  
Control  0.98 1.28 0.30 **  0.68 0.78 0.10   0.18 0.35 0.17 **  0.12 0.15 0.03  
City of London   1.46 1.62 0.16   0.79 1.14 0.35 **  0.57 0.25 -0.32 ***  0.11 0.23 0.12 ** 
All  2.80 2.75 -0.05     1.66 1.85 0.19     0.86 0.55 -0.31 ***   0.28 0.35 0.07   
                     
Panel B. 1828-1832, Y = Number of crimes per month/area  
Treated  8.20 6.57 -1.63 *  4.70 4.40 -0.30   2.80 1.33 -1.48 ***  0.70 0.85 0.15  
Uncertain  0.50 0.52 0.02   0.40 0.40 0.00   0.05 0.10 0.05   0.05 0.03 -0.03  
Control  1.70 1.38 -0.33   1.15 1.03 -0.13   0.30 0.28 -0.03   0.25 0.08 -0.17  
City of London   1.60 1.70 0.10   0.95 1.05 0.10   0.50 0.35 -0.15   0.15 0.30 0.15  
All  3.00 2.54 -0.46     1.80 1.72 -0.08     0.91 0.51 -0.40 **   0.29 0.31 0.03   
NOTES – The table shows the average number of monthly trials for crimes that took place before and after the introduction of the Metropolitan Police (and their difference), 
for all as well as each offense separately, as well as by area (separately and all areas together). The treated area includes trials for crimes located within 4 miles from Charing 
Cross, the uncertain area those located between 4 and 7 miles from Charing Cross, the control area those located more than 7 miles from Charing Cross and City of London 
those located in the City of London. Panel A shows the results for 1821-1837, Panel B for 1828-1832. The numbers are based on data from the Old Bailey Proceedings Online 
and own transcriptions/calculations; the sample includes trials for robbery, burglary and homicide. See the text for details. Statistical significance of the difference is based on 
corresponding before-after regressions. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 3. Difference-in-Differences: Effect of Metropolitan Police on Crime in the Old Bailey Proceedings 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5)   (6) (7)   (8) (9) 
Sample:  1821-1837 1825-1835 1828-1832  1821-1837 1828-1832  1821-1837 1828-1832  1821-1837 1825-1835 
Radius:  Four miles from Charing Cross 
Specification:   City of London = Control   
City of London = Treated 
from 02 April 1832   
City of London = 
Uncertain   
City of London = 
Excluded 
Panel A. Total crime (by month/area)    
Post Met x Treatment Area  -1.146** -2.157*** -1.472*  -0.880*** -1.045*  -1.177** -1.328  -1.190** -1.234 
  (0.457) (0.602) (0.797)  (0.286) (0.548)  (0.468) (0.805)  (0.468) (0.810) 
Post Met x Uncertainty Area  0.095 0.074 0.178  -0.021 0.213  -0.002 0.360  0.051 0.416 
  (0.176) (0.228) (0.353)  (0.202) (0.370)  (0.195) (0.359)   (0.220) (0.438) 
Panel B. Burglary (by month/area)    
Post Met x Treatment Area  -0.106 -0.611 -0.294  0.007 -0.285  0.020 -0.234  0.047 -0.120 
  (0.370) (0.473) (0.660)  (0.241) (0.474)  (0.382) (0.686)  (0.383) (0.701) 
Post Met x Uncertainty Area  0.016 -0.073 0.006  0.053 -0.013  0.211 0.116  0.169 0.180 
  (0.149) (0.187) (0.288)  (0.170) (0.298)  (0.163) (0.319)   (0.186) (0.377) 
Panel C. Robbery (by month/area)    
Post Met x Treatment Area  -1.032*** -1.345*** -1.297***  -0.828*** -0.832***  -1.216*** -1.281***  -1.261*** -1.336*** 
  (0.219) (0.284) (0.428)  (0.132) (0.299)  (0.224) (0.433)  (0.224) (0.438) 
Post Met x Uncertainty Area  0.129 0.190 0.228  0.005 0.288*  -0.231** 0.144  -0.100 0.189 
  (0.088) (0.119) (0.162)  (0.098) (0.170)  (0.104) (0.189)   (0.110) (0.208) 
Panel D. Homicide (by month/area)    
Post Met x Treatment Area  -0.008 -0.200 0.120  -0.060 0.072  0.019 0.188  0.024 0.222 
  (0.139) (0.186) (0.251)  (0.093) (0.181)  (0.145) (0.262)  (0.145) (0.266) 
Post Met x Uncertainty Area  -0.049 -0.043 -0.055  -0.079 -0.062  0.019 0.100  -0.018 0.047 
    (0.057) (0.074) (0.115)   (0.068) (0.119)   (0.066) (0.133)   (0.072) (0.143) 
Observations  816 528 240  816 240  816 240  612 180 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Month fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Area fixed effects   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
NOTES – The table shows the regression results corresponding to equation (1). Panel A shows the results for all offenses, Panel B for burglary, Panel C for robbery and Panel 
D for homicide. The dependent variable is the number of crimes (that are brought to trial) per month and area. In columns (1) to (3), the treated area includes crimes located 
within 4 miles from Charing Cross, the uncertain area those located between 4 and 7 miles from Charing Cross, the control area those located more than 7 miles from Charing 
Cross and City of London those located in the City of London. In columns (4) to (5), the City of London is alternatively assigned to the treatment group after establishing their 
own police (1832), in columns (6) to (7) to the uncertainty group and in columns (8) to (9) the City of London is excluded from the analysis. Regressions are based on manually 
geocoded data from the Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own transcriptions/calculations; see the text for details. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses below the 
coefficient. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 4. Robustness Checks – Alternative Aggregation Levels 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Sample:  1821-1837 1825-1835 1828-1832  1821-1837 1825-1835 1828-1832 
Radius:  Four miles from Charing Cross  Four miles from Charing Cross 
Specification:  City of London = Control 
 City of London = Control 
  
  
Extensive margin (1/0):  
By Week/area   
Extensive margin (1/0):  
By Month/distance bands 
Panel A. Total crime        
Post Met x Treatment Area -0.048 -0.079** -0.022  -0.039 -0.082** -0.034 
  (0.032) (0.038) (0.060)  (0.033) (0.040) (0.066) 
Post Met x Uncertainty Area 0.012 -0.006 -0.033  0.040 -0.009 -0.013 
  (0.030) (0.038) (0.056)  (0.035) (0.045) (0.066) 
Panel B. Burglary        
Post Met x Treatment Area -0.069* -0.091** -0.062  -0.032 -0.065 -0.064 
  (0.036) (0.045) (0.069)  (0.036) (0.045) (0.072) 
Post Met x Uncertainty Area -0.006 -0.026 -0.029  0.031 -0.010 -0.028 
  (0.026) (0.033) (0.049)  (0.031) (0.039) (0.059) 
Panel C. Robbery        
Post Met x Treatment Area -0.115*** -0.159*** -0.127*  -0.116*** -0.161*** -0.168** 
  (0.033) (0.042) (0.065)  (0.034) (0.043) (0.069) 
Post Met x Uncertainty Area 0.020 0.029 -0.002  0.018 0.022 0.027 
  (0.016) (0.022) (0.031)  (0.018) (0.025) (0.030) 
Panel D. Homicide        
Post Met x Treatment Area 0.026 0.000 0.064  0.000 -0.040 0.044 
  (0.027) (0.034) (0.047)  (0.028) (0.036) (0.051) 
Post Met x Uncertainty Area -0.005 -0.005 -0.007  0.002 -0.004 -0.008 
  (0.012) (0.016) (0.024)  (0.015) (0.019) (0.024) 
Observations  3,604 2,332 1,060  3,672 2,376 1,080 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Month fixed effects No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Week fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
Area fixed effects Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
NOTES – The table shows robustness tests for the difference-in-differences specifications of Table 3 with 
alternative aggregation levels. In columns (1) to (3), the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether 
there is any crime in given week and area. In columns (4) to (6), the dependent variable is a dummy variable 
indicating whether there is any crime in a given month and distance band from Charing Cross. Distance bands are 
circles around Charing Cross: less than 1 mile, 1-2 miles, 2-3 miles, … , 13-14 miles and more than 14 miles. See 
Table 3 for further details on specification and data. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses below the 
coefficient. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5. Summary Statistics – Daily Crime Reports  
  All   Before: 1828   After: 1830   After: 1830-1832 
Variable N Mean SD   N Mean SD   N Mean SD   N Mean SD 
All incidents: Informations + charges + property stolen                
Number of incidents: All 3,232 7.299 3.801  800 6.685 3.569  816 7.025 3.672  2,432 7.501 3.854 
Number of incidents: Property 3,232 5.748 3.264  800 5.189 3.139  816 5.592 3.138  2,432 5.932 3.283 
Number of incidents: Violent 3,232 0.203 0.492  800 0.295 0.599  816 0.178 0.445  2,432 0.173 0.447 
Number of incidents: Other 3,232 1.348 1.373   800 1.201 1.320   816 1.255 1.322   2,432 1.396 1.386 
Informations                
Number of informations: All 3,232 0.513 0.982  800 0.791 1.154  816 0.489 0.875  2,432 0.421 0.899 
Number of informations: Property 3,230 0.401 0.806  800 0.566 0.922  814 0.396 0.743  2,430 0.346 0.757 
Number of informations: Violent 3,230 0.048 0.242  800 0.101 0.362  814 0.036 0.192  2,430 0.030 0.182 
Number of informations: Other 3,230 0.065 0.282  800 0.124 0.386  814 0.059 0.274  2,430 0.045 0.236 
Any informations: All 3,232 0.311 0.463  800 0.465 0.499  816 0.316 0.465  2,432 0.260 0.439 
Any informations: Property 3,232 0.269 0.444  800 0.371 0.483  816 0.279 0.449  2,432 0.236 0.424 
Any informations: Violent 3,232 0.043 0.204  800 0.086 0.281  816 0.037 0.188  2,432 0.029 0.168 
Any informations: Other 3,232 0.057 0.232  800 0.107 0.310  816 0.053 0.224  2,432 0.040 0.197 
Charges                               
Number of charges: All 3,232 6.382 3.590  800 5.281 3.154  816 6.161 3.419  2,432 6.744 3.651 
Number of charges: Property 3,230 4.946 3.064  800 4.010 2.746  814 4.834 2.878  2,430 5.254 3.101 
Number of charges: Violent 3,230 0.155 0.421  800 0.194 0.479  814 0.143 0.402  2,430 0.143 0.399 
Number of charges: Other 3,230 1.284 1.355  800 1.077 1.271  814 1.199 1.306  2,430 1.352 1.375 
Any charges: All 3,232 0.991 0.094  800 0.983 0.131  816 0.990 0.0986  2,432 0.994 0.0783 
Any charges: Property 3,232 0.976 0.153  800 0.949 0.221  816 0.979 0.143  2,432 0.985 0.121 
Any charges: Violent 3,232 0.136 0.343  800 0.164 0.370  816 0.127 0.334  2,432 0.127 0.333 
Any charges: Other 3,232 0.660 0.474  800 0.598 0.491  816 0.627 0.484  2,432 0.681 0.466 
Property stolen                               
Number of incidents 3,230 0.405 0.750  800 0.613 0.951  814 0.376 0.655  2,430 0.337 0.656 
Any incident 3,232 0.292 0.455   800 0.394 0.489   816 0.295 0.456   2,432 0.258 0.438 
NOTES– The table shows summary statistics for the analysis sample based on the daily crime reports described in more detail in Section 3.1. The first three columns show the 
number of observations, the mean and standard deviations for the different crime measures for the complete sample, the remaining columns separately for 1828 (one year pre-
reform), 1830 (one year post-reform) and the years 1830-1832 (three years post-reform). The data was manually transcribed from the Report or Account of the Proceedings of 
the several Police Offices sourced from the National Archives (MEPO 4/12, 4/13, 4/15 and 4/17). 
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Table 6. Daily Crime Reports – Baseline Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Sample: 1828-1830 1828-1830 1828-1830 1828-1830 1828-1832 1828-1830 1828-1830 1828-1830 
Crime type: total total total total total prop viol other 
         
Panel A. Number of all incidents per day/station 
Post Met Police 0.340* 0.340** 0.337** 0.347** 0.821*** 0.406*** -0.115*** 0.056 
  (0.180) (0.161) (0.160) (0.154) (0.134) (0.135) (0.026) (0.063) 
         
Panel B. Any informations per day/station 
Post Met Police -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.206*** -0.090*** -0.049*** -0.055*** 
  (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.012) (0.013) 
         
Panel C. Number of informations per day/station 
Post Met Police -0.302*** -0.302*** -0.302*** -0.301*** -0.371*** -0.170*** -0.064*** -0.065*** 
  (0.051) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.041) (0.039) (0.014) (0.016) 
         
Panel D. Any 'stolen property' per day/station 
Post Met Police -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.099*** -0.099*** -0.137*** na na na 
  (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019)       
         
Panel E. Number of charges per day/station 
Post Met Police 0.879*** 0.879*** 0.881*** 0.890*** 1.471*** 0.827*** -0.050** 0.126** 
  (0.164) (0.146) (0.144) (0.140) (0.120) (0.121) (0.022) (0.061) 
Observations 1,616 1,616 1,616 1,616 3,232 1,616 1,616 1,616 
Office FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Calendar week FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of week FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOTES – The table shows the regression results corresponding to equation (2). For a description of the underlying data, see Section 3.1. The dependent variable in Panel A is 
the number of all incidents (informations, stolen property incidents and charges), in Panel B a dummy variable indicating whether there are any informations, in Panel C the 
number of informations, in Panel D a dummy variable indicating whether there are any stolen property reports and in Panel E the number of charges. The top of each column 
indicates the years included in the sample and where appropriate the crime category. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. Daily Crime Reports – Different Stages of Police Hiring 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9)   (10) 
Sample: 1828-1832  1828-1832  1828-1832  1828-1832 
Y: Number of all incidents  Number of charges  Any informations  Any 'stolen property' 
Crime type: total prop. viol.   total prop. viol.   total prop. viol.   total 
              
Post Met: 1830, Jan. -0.496* -0.158 -0.130***  0.030 0.214 -0.056  -0.114*** -0.045 -0.055***  -0.114*** 
 (0.268) (0.233) (0.043)  (0.246) (0.209) (0.037)  (0.038) (0.038) (0.019)  (0.040) 
Post Met: 1830, > Jan. 0.632*** 0.606*** -0.111***  1.177*** 1.040*** -0.049**  -0.160*** -0.106*** -0.046***  -0.094*** 
 (0.176) (0.153) (0.027)  (0.163) (0.140) (0.023)  (0.024) (0.023) (0.012)  (0.025) 
Post Met: 1831 0.772*** 0.688*** -0.131***  1.382*** 1.146*** -0.065***  -0.220*** -0.141*** -0.054***  -0.125*** 
 (0.165) (0.141) (0.026)  (0.151) (0.129) (0.021)  (0.021) (0.021) (0.011)  (0.023) 
Post Met: 1832 1.350*** 1.147*** -0.117***  2.157*** 1.783*** -0.034  -0.250*** -0.174*** -0.068***  -0.187*** 
 (0.175) (0.151) (0.026)  (0.160) (0.137) (0.022)  (0.021) (0.021) (0.011)  (0.022) 
              
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.853  0.000 0.000 0.483  0.000 0.000 0.079  0.000 
                            
Observations 3,232 3,232 3,232  3,232 3,232 3,232  3,232 3,232 3,232  3,232 
Office FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Calendar week FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Day of week FE Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes   Yes 
NOTES – The table shows the regression results corresponding to equation (2) but allowing for separate coefficients by time after the introduction of the Met (note that the 
second wave of hiring, mainly in the outer divisions, occurred in February 1830). For a description of the underlying data, see Section 3.1. The dependent variable in columns 
(1) to (3) is the total number of any incidents (charges, informations, property stolen incidents), in columns (4) to (6) the number of charges, in columns (7) to (9) a dummy 
variable indicating whether there are any informations, and in column (10) a dummy variable indicating whether there are any stolen property. The top of each column indicates 
the years included in the sample and the crime category. The p-value corresponds to the test of equality of all four shown coefficients. Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses below the estimated coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8. Summary Statistics for County-Level Analysis 
  All Counties: 1832-1865   Early Reformers: N= 16   Mid-Reformers: N= 9   Late Reformers: N = 23 
  N mean SD   N mean SD   N mean SD   N mean SD 
Fiscal Start Year 1,632 1850 8  544 1840 0  306 1848 6  782 1857 0 
Force existence all year 1,632 0.45 0.50  544 0.74 0.44  306 0.50 0.50  782 0.24 0.42 
Charges 1,632 367 505  544 569 731  306 304 321  782 251 276 
Violent charges 1,440 62 86  480 94 128  270 51 53  690 43 45 
Property charges 1,440 279 392  480 434 567  270 228 247  690 190 218 
Other charges 1440 12 18  480 18 24  270 13 19  690 9 11 
Charge rate (per 1000) 1,632 1.79 1.66  544 1.88 0.96  306 2.49 2.95  782 1.45 1.19 
Violent charge rate (per 1000) 1,440 0.30 0.26  480 0.31 0.14  270 0.41 0.45  690 0.26 0.19 
Property charge rate (per 1000) 1,440 1.33 1.30  480 1.41 0.79  270 1.85 2.28  690 1.07 0.94 
Other charge rate (per 1000) 1440 0.06 0.09   480 0.06 0.04   270 0.11 0.18   690 0.05 0.05 
Snap Shot Variables                
England 48 0.75 0.44  16 0.88 0.34  9 0.67 0.50  23 0.70 0.47 
Wales 48 0.25 0.44  16 0.13 0.34  9 0.33 0.50  23 0.30 0.47 
Number parishes 48 190 156  16 236 176  9 154 127  23 173 151 
Acres 48 642,642 347,403  16 733,137 277,302  9 507,433 244,367  23 632,598 412,494 
Population (1858 Jud.Stats.) 48 191,492 153,919  16 272,118 200,542  9 132,879 93,997  23 158,340 112,680 
People per police (initial) 47 2,857 2,493  15 3,098 1,974  9 3,074 3,223  23 2,615 2,572 
Share suff.large (<1500) at creation 47 0.21 0.41  15 0.20 0.41  9 0.33 0.50  23 0.17 0.39 
People per police (1858) 48 1,700 632  16 1,554 377  9 1,850 1215  23 1,742 440 
1851 Census Variables                
Farmer (share) 48 0.15 0.09  16 0.12 0.08  9 0.16 0.10  23 0.18 0.09 
Male (share) 48 0.48 0.01  16 0.48 0.01  9 0.48 0.02  23 0.49 0.01 
Married (share) 48 0.33 0.01  16 0.34 0.01  9 0.33 0.01  23 0.33 0.02 
Native (share) 48 0.98 0.02  16 0.98 0.02  9 0.99 0.01  23 0.98 0.02 
Employed (share) 48 0.67 0.03  16 0.69 0.03  9 0.67 0.02  23 0.67 0.03 
Out of labor force (share) 48 0.33 0.03  16 0.31 0.03  9 0.33 0.02  23 0.33 0.03 
Age 0-15 (share) 48 0.38 0.01  16 0.38 0.01  9 0.38 0.01  23 0.38 0.01 
Age 16-25 (share) 48 0.18 0.01  16 0.18 0.01  9 0.18 0.01  23 0.18 0.01 
Age 26-35 (share) 48 0.14 0.01  16 0.14 0.01  9 0.14 0.01  23 0.14 0.01 
Age 36-45 (share) 48 0.11 0.00  16 0.11 0.00  9 0.11 0.01  23 0.11 0.00 
Age 46-55 (share) 48 0.08 0.00  16 0.08 0.00  9 0.08 0.01  23 0.08 0.00 
Age 56-65 (share) 48 0.06 0.01  16 0.06 0.01  9 0.06 0.01  23 0.06 0.01 
Age 66 plus (share) 48 0.05 0.01   16 0.05 0.01   9 0.05 0.01   23 0.05 0.01 
NOTES – The table shows summary statistics for the analysis sample of counties for the county force roll-out analysis from 1832 - 1865. Charges by crime type were unavailable 
for 1832, 1833, 1840, 1852. See Sections 4.1 and 4.2 for details.  
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Table 9. Baseline Effect of Creating Any County Police Force on Crime 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 
Dep. Variable:  
Log (Number of Charges)  
Dep. Variable:  
Log (Charge Rate) 
 First Treated Year Defined as Police Force Existed for: 
  Any of  year All of year   Any of  year All of year 
Panel A: All Charges    
Force 0.008 -0.024  0.015 -0.018 
 [0.037] [0.033]  [0.038] [0.034] 
      
Observations 1,632 1,632  1,632 1,632 
R-squared 0.959 0.959   0.891 0.891 
Panel B: Violent Charges    
Force -0.018 -0.031  -0.006 -0.020 
 [0.053] [0.050]  [0.054] [0.051]       
Observations 1,431 1,431  1,431 1,431 
R-squared 0.894 0.894   0.712 0.712 
Panel C: Property Charges    
Force 0.029 0.017  0.041 0.027 
 [0.044] [0.042]  [0.043] [0.042] 
      
Observations 1,440 1,440  1,440 1,440 
R-squared 0.958 0.958   0.896 0.896 
Panel D: Other Charges    
Force 0.054 0.002   0.067 0.013 
 [0.080] [0.078]   [0.081] [0.079]       
Observations 1,267 1,267  1,267 1,267 
R-squared 0.771 0.772   0.509 0.511 
NOTES – The table presents the results of the baseline difference-in-differences specification (see equation (3)), 
where the variable of interest Force is equal to one for a county c in any year t after which a county police force 
has been created. The year of police force formation is defined as the first year with a police force for any of the 
year in columns (1) and (3) and a police force for all of the year in columns (2) and (4). All specifications include 
county and year fixed effects. The baseline sample includes 48 counties for the years 1832-1865. Standard errors 
are clustered by county and shown in brackets below the coefficient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10. Police Force in Name Only? Heterogeneity by Police Force Size  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Dep. Variable: Log (Number of Charges) 
 
Police Force Size Defined According to the Below Thresholds in the  
# of People Per Policeman (upon police force creation) 
  1,500 1,750 2,000 2,250 2,500 
Panel A: All Charges     
Force Sufficiently Large -0.190*** -0.127** -0.118** -0.109** -0.079  
[0.062] [0.058] [0.055] [0.049] [0.048] 
Force Insufficiently Large 0.022 0.040 0.053 0.088 0.066  
[0.043] [0.051] [0.057] [0.068] [0.075] 
Panel B: Violent Charges     
Force Sufficiently Large -0.183* -0.134 -0.129* -0.130** -0.093  
[0.104] [0.080] [0.070] [0.062] [0.062] 
Force Insufficiently Large -0.002 0.020 0.034 0.081 0.048  
[0.058] [0.068] [0.078] [0.094] [0.104] 
Panel C: Property Charges     
Force Sufficiently Large -0.143** -0.073 -0.063 -0.050 -0.028  
[0.065] [0.069] [0.066] [0.058] [0.057] 
Force Insufficiently Large 0.064 0.080 0.090 0.113 0.101  
[0.050] [0.055] [0.060] [0.073] [0.083] 
Panel D: Other Charges     
Force Sufficiently Large -0.181 -0.079 -0.055 -0.071 -0.049  
[0.120] 
[0.099] [0.097] [0.090] [0.089] 
Force Insufficiently Large 0.027 0.022 0.009 0.055 0.030 
  [0.077] [0.088] [0.092] [0.099] [0.107] 
NOTES – This table presents the results of the baseline difference-in-differences specification (see Table 9), where 
the variables of interest - Force Sufficiently Large and Force Insufficiently Large - are equal to one for a county c 
in any year t after which an sufficiently large or insufficiently large police force has been created. Sufficiency is 
defined according to the number of people per officer, and varies as indicated at the top of each column. The year 
of police force creation is defined as the first year with a police force for all of the fiscal year. All specifications 
include county and year fixed effects. The baseline sample includes 48 counties for the years 1832-1865. Standard 
errors are clustered by county and shown in brackets below the coefficient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11. Spillover Effects of Neighboring Police Forces  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Log (Number charges) Log (Number violent charges) Log (Number property charges) Log (Number other charges) 
                          
Own Force Sufficiently Large -0.190*** -0.190*** -0.184*** -0.183* -0.183* -0.182* -0.143** -0.143** -0.140** -0.181 -0.180 -0.188 
 [0.062] [0.069] [0.060] [0.104] [0.108] [0.101] [0.065] [0.068] [0.063] [0.120] [0.117] [0.117] 
Own Force Insufficiently Large 0.022 0.021 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 -0.030 0.064 0.062 0.040 0.027 0.027 0.001 
 [0.043] [0.044] [0.045] [0.058] [0.059] [0.059] [0.050] [0.049] [0.052] [0.077] [0.075] [0.074] 
Any Neighboring Force  0.189***   0.109   0.253***    -0.168**   
  [0.059]   [0.112]   [0.055]    [0.072]   
Any Neighboring Sufficiently Large Force    -0.158**   -0.192**   -0.149**     -0.195** 
   [0.060]   [0.074]   [0.068]     [0.080] 
Any Neighboring Insufficiently Large Force   0.131**   0.064   0.199***     -0.010 
   [0.055]   [0.137]   [0.054]     [0.109] 
Observations 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,431 1,431 1,431 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,267 1,267 1,267 
R-squared 0.960 0.961 0.961 0.894 0.895 0.896 0.959 0.960 0.960 0.775 0.776 0.777 
NOTES – The table shows the regression results when estimating the effects of having a police force (at all or one that is sufficiently or insufficiently large) in a neighboring 
county. A sufficiently large force (whether it is a county’s own or a neighbor’s police force) is defined as a police force with less than 1,500 people per officer. Middlesex, 
though excluded from the analysis sample, is classified as a sufficiently large neighbor for those sharing a border after 1829. The year of police force formation is defined as 
the first year with a police force for all of the year. All specifications include county and year fixed effects. The baseline sample includes 48 counties for the years 1832-1865. 
Standard errors are clustered by county and shown in brackets below the coefficient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
60 
 
Appendix A: Additional Figures and Tables 
 
Appendix Figure A1. London Murders and Homicides 
  
 
NOTES – The figure compares two measures of homicides in London between 1715 and 1900. The black solid 
line shows the number of trials for murder at the Old Bailey, retrieved from The Old Bailey Proceedings Online. 
The grey dashed line shows the number of London homicides compiled in “Homicides in New York City, 1797-
1999 [And Various Historical Comparison Sites]” by Eric Monkkonen (retrieved on April 25, 2019 from 
https://cjrc.osu.edu/research/interdisciplinary/hvd/europe/london). The dashed vertical lines mark the years 1821-
1837 (our sample period). 
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Appendix Figure A2. Differences in Means by Distance Band (Old Bailey) 
 
Panel A. 1828-1832  
 
 
Panel B. 1821-1837 
 
 
NOTES – The figures plot the differences in means (of the number of trials per month and 1-mile distance band) 
before and after the introduction of the Metropolitan Police, for all trials in the sample (solid line) as well as 
separately for burglary (long dashed line), robbery (short dashed line) and homicide (dotted line). The difference 
in means is separately computed for each 1-mile distance band around Charing Cross. Panel A shows the results 
for the 1828 to 1832 sample period and Panel B for the 1821 to 1837 sample period, respectively. The dashed 
vertical lines mark the thresholds in terms of distance from Charing Cross for the treated, uncertain and control 
area, respectively. The figures are based on data from the Old Bailey Proceedings Online and own 
transcriptions/calculations.
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Appendix Figure A3. Deaths of Metropolitan Police Officers 
 
 
 
NOTES –The figure shows the number of deaths of Metropolitan Police Officers between 1830 and 1836, overall 
(solid black line) and due to Cholera (dashed black line). The figures as based on manually transcribed data from 
the Returns to Death 1829-1889 sourced from the National Archives (MEPO 4/2). 
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Appendix Figure A4. Historical Population Estimates by Region of London 
 
Panel A. Population Levels 
 
Panel B. Population Growth 
 
NOTES – Panel A shows the historical population estimate (in thousands) for the different regions of London 
(black line: inner London excluding the City of London; dark grey line: outer London; light grey line: City of 
London) from 1811 to 1901. Panel B shows the resulting population growth rate in percent. The data was retrieved 
from the Historical Census Population provided by the Office for National Statistics.
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Appendix Figure A5. Charges Brought to Trial as a Crime Proxy (County Analysis) 
 
NOTES – The figure presents the national annual number of crimes committed, charges brought to trial, and 
individuals apprehended in all England and Wales counties, excluding Middlesex, York, Suffolk, and Sussex from 
1857 to 1891. The number of charges to trial is the main outcome variable used in the county-level analysis, as it 
is the only measure available prior to 1857. This figure demonstrates that it is a potentially good proxy for crime. 
See Section 4.1 for details and data sources. 
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Appendix Figure A6. Event-Study: Sufficiently/Insufficiently Large County Forces, Crime Type 
 
Panel A: Violent Charges  
  
Panel B: Property Charges  
  
Panel C: Other Charges  
  
NOTES – The figures shows the results from event-study specifications for the county-level analysis separately 
by crime type. See Figure 12 for details.  
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Appendix Table A1. Metropolitan Police – Initial Hiring in Two Stages 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Police division(s): 
Metropolitan Police 
Police office(s): 
Pre-existing Police 
All hires:  
21 Sep 1829  
- 27 Mar 1830 
All hires:  
21 Sep 1829  
- 27 Mar 1830 
Early hires: 
21 Sep 1829 
- 31 Jan 1830 
Late hires:  
01 Feb 1830 
- 27 Mar 1830 
Category 
  all service length  >= 250 days Early/late 
              
Panel A. Separately by division 
A Queen Square 125 60 49 11 early 
B Queen Square 261 136 111 25 early 
C Marlborough Street 300 146 132 14 early 
D Marylebone 280 150 126 24 early 
E Hatton Garden 263 155 139 16 early 
F Bow Street 289 137 118 19 early 
G Hatton Garden, Worship Street 226 156 24 132 late 
H Lambeth Street, Worship Street 221 125 18 107 late 
K Lambeth Street, Thames 210 164 19 145 late 
L Queen Square 202 154 20 134 late 
M Union Hall 207 146 16 130 late 
N Hatton Garden, Worship Street 95 51 0 51 late 
P Union Hall 231 140 12 128 late 
R Union Hall 39 30 0 30 late 
S Marylebone 260 158 40 118 late 
T Queen Square 9 6 0 6 late 
V Queen Square 9 6 0 6 late        
Panel B. Aggregated by divsion-office 
C Marlborough Street 300 146 132 14 early 
F Bow Street 289 137 118 19 early 
EGHKN Hatton Garden, Lambeth Street, Worship Street, (Thames) 1015 651 200 451 mixed 
ABLTV Queen Square 606 362 180 182 mixed 
DS Marylebone 540 308 166 142 mixed 
MPR Union Hall 477 316 28 288 late 
NOTES - Panel A shows the number of hires by the Metropolitan police separately for each police division (of the Metropolitan Police), Panel B for aggregated police divisions 
by police office (of the pre-existing police). Matching of police divisions to police offices is based on the 1832 Daily Crime Reports listing the division letter next to each entry 
(National Archives, MEPO 4/17). The number of police officers who joined the Met is based on data from the first 3000 police warrant numbers from the Register of recruits 
into the Metropolitan Police (National Archives, MEPO 4/31). Before February 1830 includes the time period from 21 September 1829 until 31 January 1830; After February 
1830 includes the time period from 01 February 1830 until 27 March 1830. The column ‘category’ presents our own assessment of the timing of the initial hiring by office.    
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Appendix Table A2. Descriptive Statistics - Old Bailey Proceedings Data 
    within 7-miles radius   City of London   outside 7-miles radius 
Variable   
1821-
1829 
1829-
1837 
1825-
1835 
1828-
1832   
1821-
1829 
1829-
1837 
1825-
1835 
1828-
1832   
1821-
1829 
1829-
1837 
1825-
1835 
1828-
1832 
Crime                 
Number of crime incidents  915 806 1161 458  153 161 228 100  102 128 148 89 
Burglary   540 544 736 294  82 114 153 61  71 78 99 64 
Manslaughter  35 73 76 30  8 16 20 11  3 7 6 5 
Murder  59 30 61 20  4 6 5 4  9 8 10 3 
Robbery   281 159 288 114  59 25 50 24  19 35 33 17 
Distance to Charing Cross 
(miles)  1.935 2.208 2.110 2.058  1.659 1.637 1.633 1.624  10.371 10.244 10.289 10.631 
Distance to Charing Cross (in 
km)  3.114 3.553 3.395 3.311  2.670 2.635 2.628 2.612  16.687 16.483 16.555 17.104 
Number of co-defendants  1.414 1.297 1.373 1.376  1.320 1.261 1.303 1.260  1.578 1.359 1.507 1.562 
Days crime to session start  33.547 29.211 32.944 34.590  67.283 30.416 55.537 33.545  60.657 79.570 51.939 49.584 
                                
Police                
Any police witness (1/0)  0.830 0.839 0.839 0.852  0.869 0.783 0.846 0.870  0.794 0.805 0.804 0.831 
# of police first 5 witnesses 
who are:  1.403 1.371 1.430 1.504  1.490 1.385 1.425 1.450  1.186 1.281 1.243 1.337 
Constable                
Policeman  0.309 0.315 0.298 0.293  0.301 0.261 0.294 0.260  0.559 0.633 0.662 0.809 
Watchman  0.001 0.733 0.384 0.395  0.000 0.342 0.171 0.180  0.000 0.172 0.095 0.079 
Other (pre-Met type)  0.363 0.032 0.215 0.242  0.386 0.230 0.285 0.250  0.108 0.102 0.101 0.079 
Other (post-Met type)  0.573 0.145 0.385 0.410  0.706 0.342 0.526 0.600  0.373 0.281 0.277 0.258 
Missing  0.023 0.127 0.083 0.116  0.039 0.124 0.075 0.090  0.000 0.070 0.047 0.056 
Police at crime scene (1/0)  3.715 3.644 3.622 3.517  3.562 3.696 3.645 3.620  3.951 3.734 3.804 3.708 
                                
NOTES - The table shows descriptive statistics for the geocoded crime data from the Old Bailey Proceedings Online (see Section 3.1 for details). One observation is one crime 
incident (trial). Except for the number of crime incidents, the table reports means for each respective sample. The sample restrictions for each column are indicated at the top of 
the column.
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Appendix Table A3. Sensitivity Analysis for Difference-in-Differences Estimation (Old Bailey Data) 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
Sample:  1821-1837 1828-1832  1821-1837 1828-1832  1821-1837 1828-1832  1821-1837 1828-1832 
Specification:  Area specific trend Exclude "long streets" locations Include only "no issue" locations Exclude missing crime dates 
Panel A. Total crime          
Post Met x Treatment Area  -2.641*** -1.411  -1.206*** -1.688**  -0.452 -1.160**  -1.168** -1.459* 
  (0.864) (1.255)  (0.411) (0.759)  (0.339) (0.525)  (0.456) (0.787) 
Post Met x Uncertainty Area  0.042 0.450  0.093 0.162  -0.116 -0.085  0.094 0.166 
  (0.345) (0.568)  (0.170) (0.339)  (0.143) (0.260)  (0.176) (0.351) 
Panel B. Burglary          
Post Met x Treatment Area  -0.913 0.257  -0.371 -0.462  -0.003 -0.831*  -0.106 -0.294 
  (0.716) (1.156)  (0.339) (0.630)  (0.262) (0.453)  (0.370) (0.660) 
Post Met x Uncertainty Area  -0.155 -0.132  0.028 0.088  -0.041 -0.156  0.016 0.006 
  (0.281) (0.418)  (0.144) (0.274)  (0.118) (0.213)  (0.149) (0.288) 
Panel C. Robbery          
Post Met x Treatment Area  -1.408*** -1.449***  -0.803*** -1.222***  -0.563*** -0.521*  -1.032*** -1.297*** 
  (0.410) (0.476)  (0.190) (0.385)  (0.161) (0.304)  (0.219) (0.428) 
Post Met x Uncertainty Area  0.304* 0.565*  0.096 0.128  -0.016 0.129  0.129 0.228 
  (0.177) (0.300)  (0.081) (0.143)  (0.069) (0.114)  (0.088) (0.162) 
Panel D. Homicide          
Post Met x Treatment Area  -0.320 -0.219  -0.033 -0.003  0.115 0.192  -0.030 0.132 
  (0.271) (0.373)  (0.130) (0.227)  (0.102) (0.181)  (0.138) (0.254) 
Post Met x Uncertainty Area  -0.107 0.017  -0.031 -0.053  -0.059 -0.058  -0.050 -0.068 
  (0.103) (0.157)  (0.056) (0.113)  (0.046) (0.100)  (0.057) (0.114) 
Observations  816 240  816 240  816 240  816 240 
Year, month, and area fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
NOTES – The table shows sensitivity analyses of the difference-in-differences estimation shown in columns (1) to (3) of Table 3 (see notes in that table for details on the 
baseline specification). The estimation windows are shown at the top of each column. Columns (1) to (2) add an area-specific annual trend; columns  (3) and (4) exclude 
locations that were identified as “long streets” only (and potentially misclassified as treated); columns (5) and (6) exclude locations for which we had to refer to historical maps; 
columns (7) and (8) exclude observations for which the date of the actual crime is missing in the data and proxied by the session start date instead in the baseline estimation. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses below the coefficient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table A4. Alternative Standard Errors (Old Bailey Data) 
 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5)   (6) (7)   (8) (9) 
Sample:  1821-1837 1825-1835 1828-1832  1821-1837 1828-1832  1821-1837 1828-1832  1821-1837 1825-1835 
Radius:  Four miles from Charing Cross 
Specification:   City of London = Control   
City of London = Treated 
from 02 April 1832   
City of London = 
Uncertain   
City of London = 
Excluded 
Panel A. Total crime (by month/area)    
Post Met x Treatment Area  -1.146*** -2.157*** -1.472***  -0.880 -1.045***  -1.177*** -1.328***  -1.190*** -1.234*** 
  0.002 0.002 0.002  0.494 0.002  0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002 
Post Met x Uncertainty Area  0.095 0.074 0.178  -0.021 0.213  -0.002 0.360  0.051 0.416 
  0.286 0.536 0.492  0.756 0.492  0.862 0.096   0.536 0.536 
Panel B. Burglary (by month/area)    
Post Met x Treatment Area  -0.106 -0.611*** -0.294  0.007 -0.285***  0.020 -0.234  0.047 -0.120 
  0.496 0.002 0.108  0.890 0.002  0.906 0.254  0.536 0.748 
Post Met x Uncertainty Area  0.016 -0.073 0.006  0.053 -0.013  0.211*** 0.116  0.169*** 0.180 
  0.880 0.470 0.890  0.598 0.850  0.000 0.742   0.000 0.536 
Panel C. Robbery (by month/area)    
Post Met x Treatment Area  -1.032 -1.345*** -1.297***  -0.828 -0.832  -1.216*** -1.281***  -1.261*** -1.336*** 
  0.504 0.002 0.002  0.494 0.244  0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002 
Post Met x Uncertainty Area  0.129 0.190 0.228  0.005 0.288  -0.231 0.144  -0.100 0.189 
  0.494 0.494 0.154  0.864 0.308  0.348 0.762   0.494 0.762 
Panel D. Homicide (by month/area)    
Post Met x Treatment Area  -0.008 -0.200 0.120  -0.060 0.072  0.019 0.188  0.024 0.222 
  0.746 0.375 0.455  0.496 0.492  0.758 0.387  0.758 1.000 
Post Met x Uncertainty Area  -0.049 -0.043 -0.055  -0.079 -0.062  0.019 0.100  -0.018 0.047 
    0.496 0.468 0.508   0.496 0.680   0.870 0.491   0.764 1.000 
Observations  816 528 240  816 240  816 240  612 180 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Month fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Area fixed effects   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
NOTES – See notes of Old Bailey baseline table (Table 3). Clustered standard errors are based on a Wild Cluster Bootstrap (1,000 repetitions); p-values are shown in italics 
below the coefficient. Standard errors are clustered by area (treated, uncertain, control, city). 
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Appendix Table A5. Robustness Checks for Pre-Post Estimation (Daily Crime Reports) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)   (9) (10) (11) 
Sample:  1828-32 1828-32 1828-32 1828-32 1828-32 1828-32 1828-32 1828-32  1828-32 1828-32 1828-32 
Crime type:   total total total total total total total total   total total total 
Specification:  Drop one office at the time:  Weekly 
    
Bow 
Street 
Hatton 
Garden 
Lambeth 
Street 
Marlye-
bone 
Marlborough 
Street 
Queen 
Square 
Union 
Hall 
Worship 
Street   
All 
weeks 
Complet
e  
weeks  
Log 
outcome 
Panel A. Number of all incidents 
Post Met 
Police  0.17 0.29* 0.35** 0.37** 0.59*** 0.20 0.42** 0.39**  5.09*** 0.67 0.13*** 
    (0.164) (0.165) (0.167) (0.168) (0.162) (0.169) (0.165) (0.159)   (1.090) (1.411) (0.044) 
Panel B. Any informations 
Post Met 
Police  -0.18*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.17***  -0.22*** -0.13*** - 
    (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)   (0.034) (0.047)   
Panel C. Any 'stolen property' 
Post Met 
Police  -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.1*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.10***  -0.73*** -0.71*** - 
    (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)   (0.119) (0.165)   
Panel D. Number of charges 
Post Met 
Police  0.72*** 0.87*** 0.89*** 0.91*** 1.14*** 0.76*** 0.88*** 0.96***  8.63*** 3.98*** 0.28*** 
    (0.150) (0.148) (0.152) (0.153) (0.147) (0.152) (0.150) (0.142)   (1.003) (1.333) (0.045) 
Observations  1,414 1,414 1,414 1,414 1,414 1,414 1,414 1,414  576 240 576 
Office FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Cal. week FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
NOTES – The table shows robustness checks for the pre-post estimation from the Daily Crime Reports presented in Table 6. Columns (1) to (8) drop one office at the time from 
the regression sample; the excluded office is indicated at the top of each column. Columns (9) to (11) present the results when the data is aggregated at the weekly instead of 
the daily level for all weeks, complete weeks only and for all weeks but using the log instead of the level number of charges. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses 
below the coefficient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table A6. Dates of County Police Force Formation and Size of Initial Force 
County Name Start Month Start Year Fiscal Start Year 
First Whole 
(fiscal) Year 
Initial Force 
Size 
Initial People 
per Police 
Gloucester 11 1839 1840 1841 250 1089 
Norfolk 11 1839 1840 1841 133 2137 
Wilts 11 1839 1840 1841 201 1140 
Lancaster 12 1839 1840 1841 500 1184 
Leicester 12 1839 1840 1841 25 5807 
Southampton 12 1839 1840 1841 106 2024 
Worcester 12 1839 1840 1841 41 4159 
Northampton 1 1840 1840 1841 29 4694 
Essex 2 1840 1840 1841 116 2144 
Bedford 3 1840 1840 1841 47 1837 
Durham 3 1840 1840 1841 66 2523 
Salop 3 1840 1840 1841 23 8198 
Nottingham 4 1840 1840 1841 42 3988 
Denbigh 5 1840 1840 1841 28 2986 
Montgomery 7 1840 1840 1841 26 2557 
Stafford . 1840 1840 1841 . . 
Hertford 4 1841 1841 1842 71 1819 
Glamorgan . 1841 1841 1842 39 3665 
Carmarthen 7 1843 1843 1844 57 1694 
Cardigan 3 1844 1844 1845 18 3821 
Rutland 6 1848 1848 1849 2 11248 
Surrey 1 1851 1851 1852 71 1532 
Cambridge 11 1851 1852 1853 70 1252 
Berks 2 1856 1856 1857 94 1315 
Somerset 5 1856 1856 1857 267 1316 
Flint 11 1856 1857 1858 26 2494 
Dorset 12 1856 1857 1858 110 1398 
Brecon 1 1857 1857 1858 29 1903 
Cornwall 1 1857 1857 1858 179 1687 
Cumberland 1 1857 1857 1858 60 2819 
Devon 1 1857 1857 1858 300 1421 
Hereford 1 1857 1857 1858 45 2195 
Kent 1 1857 1857 1858 231 1355 
Lincoln 1 1857 1857 1858 207 1651 
Radnor 1 1857 1857 1858 10 2464 
Westmoreland 1 1857 1857 1858 14 3422 
Bucks 2 1857 1857 1858 102 1531 
Warwick 2 1857 1857 1858 133 1373 
Derby 3 1857 1857 1858 154 1662 
Monmouth 3 1857 1857 1858 49 2352 
Oxford 3 1857 1857 1858 10 14062 
Anglesey 4 1857 1857 1858 16 3420 
Carnarvon 4 1857 1857 1858 37 2558 
Chester 4 1857 1857 1858 173 1703 
Huntingdon 4 1857 1857 1858 41 1572 
Northumberland 4 1857 1857 1858 61 2811 
Pembroke 6 1857 1857 1858 33 2242 
Merioneth 9 1857 1857 1858 19 2046 
Middlesex Excluded since London cannot be separated. 
York 
Excluded since rural counties included multiple jurisdictions with different force start dates; 
but crime data was not available for same sub-jurisdicitons. 
Sussex 
Suffolk 
NOTES – The table shows the date of police force formation by county, the first fiscal year with an existent police 
force, the initial size of the police force as well as the initial people-per-police ratio. For two counties, Stafford 
and Glamorgan, the month of police force formation is missing in our data. We treat this as January of that year. 
See Sections 4.1 and  4.2 for more detail on the data.
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Appendix Table A7. Offence Categories in the Judicial Statistics 
Classification 
in this paper 
Judicial Statistics:  
Broad Category Judicial Statistics: Specific Offenses  
Violent Offences Against Person Murder, Attempted Murder, Shooting/Stabbing/Wounding to Maim, Manslaughter, Attempts to Procure Miscarriage, 
Concealing Birth of Infant, Sodomy, Assaults to Commit Sodomy, Rape, Carnal Abuse, Assault with Intent to 
Carnally Abuse, Abduction, Bigamy, Child Stealing, Assaults (and Inflicting Bodily Harm), Assaults (Common), 
Assaults of Peace Officers. 
  Offences Against Property,  
with Violence 
Sacrilege, Burglary, Burglary (attended with Violence to Persons),  Housebreaking, Breaking into Shops/Warehouses 
and Stealing, Breaking within Curtilage of Dwelling Houses and Stealing, Robbery, Robbery and Attempted Robbery 
by Persons Armed in Company, Robbery (Attended with Wounding and Cutting), Obtaining Property by THreats to 
Accuse of Unnatural Crimes, Assaults to Rob and Demand Property with Menace, Stealing in Dwelling Houses such 
that Persons Therein Are Put in Fear, Sending Menacing Letters to Extort Money, Piracy 
Property Offences Against Property,  
without Violence 
Cattle Stealing, Horse Stealing, Sheep Stealing, Larceny to Value of £5 in Dwelling Houses, Larceny from Person, 
Larceny by Servants, Simple Larceny, Stealing from Vessels, Stealing Goods in the Process of Manufacture, Stealing 
Fixtures/Trees/Shrubs, Misdemeanors with intent to steal, Embezzlement, Stealing and Receiving Letters Stolen from 
the Post Office by Servants, Receiving Stolen Goods, Frauds and Attempts to Defraud 
Other Property Malicious Offences Against 
Property 
Setting Fire to a Dwelling or Shop (Persons therein), Setting Fire to a House/Warehouse/Cornstack, Setting Fire to 
Crops/Plantations/Heath, Attempted Arson, Riot and Feloniously Demolishing Buildings/Machinery, Destroying 
Silk/Woolen Goods in Manufacturing Process, Destroying Hop-binds/Trees/Shrubs, Killing and Maiming Cattle, 
Sending Threatening Letters to Commit Arson, Other Malicious Offences 
 
Forgery and Offences Against the 
Currency 
Forging and Uttering Forged Bank of England Notes, Forging and Uttering Other Forged Instruments, Having in 
Possession Forged Bank of England Notes, Counterfeiting Current Gold and Silver Coins, Having in Possession 
Implements for Coining, Buying and Putting Off Counterfeit Gold and Silver Coin, Uttering and Having in Possession 
Counterfeit Gold and Silver Coin  
 Other Offences not Included in the 
Above Classes 
High Treason and Feloniously Compassing to Levy War, Assembling Armed to Aid Smugglers, Assaulting Officers 
Employed to Prevent Smuggling, Deer Stealing and Feloniously Wounding Deer Keepers, Being Out Armed/Taking 
Game/And Assaulting Game Keepers, Taking and Destroying Fish in Enclosed Water, Being at Large Under Sentence 
of Transportation, Prison Breaking, Harbouring and Aiding the Escape of Felons, Riot, Sedition, Breach of the Peace, 
Refusing to Aid Peace Officers, Keeping Disorderly Houses, Indecently Exposing the Person, Felonies Not Included 
Above, Misdemeanors Not Included Above 
NOTES – The table lists the offense categories as in the Judicial Statistics and as classified by us to define the outcome variables for the county level analysis. See Sections 4.1 
and 4.2 for details. 
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Appendix Table A8. Sensitivity Analysis for Sufficiently and Insufficiently Large County Police Force Results  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Sample Years: 1832-1865 1832-1865 1832-1865 1832-1865 1832-1865 1835-1862 1832-1849 1850-1865 1832-1865 
Sample Counties all all all all all all all all English 
Force Sufficiently Large -0.190*** -0.207*** -0.202*** -0.207*** -0.190*** -0.153** -0.088** -0.074 -0.099*  
[0.062] [0.062] [0.062] [0.070] [0.062] [0.062] [0.035] [0.072] [0.056] 
Force Insufficiently Large 0.022 0.043 0.051 0.034 0.022 0.020 0.008 0.005 -0.024 
  [0.043] [0.046] [0.046] [0.043] [0.043] [0.044] [0.061] [0.073] [0.046] 
Force Sufficiently Large -0.183* -0.199** -0.184** -0.220** -0.183* -0.134 -0.049 -0.094 -0.114  
[0.104] [0.086] [0.086] [0.103] [0.104] [0.119] [0.194] [0.101] [0.104] 
Force Insufficiently Large -0.002 0.040 0.055 0.013 -0.002 0.005 0.068 -0.103 -0.058 
  [0.058] [0.058] [0.056] [0.058] [0.058] [0.060] [0.089] [0.108] [0.054] 
Force Sufficiently Large -0.143** -0.152** -0.148** -0.147* -0.143** -0.124** -0.025 -0.026 -0.046  
[0.065] [0.067] [0.069] [0.077] [0.065] [0.061] [0.064] [0.069] [0.054] 
Force Insufficiently Large 0.064 0.087* 0.095* 0.071 0.064 0.059 0.050 0.038 0.008 
  [0.050] [0.050] [0.051] [0.049] [0.050] [0.050] [0.069] [0.071] [0.055] 
Force Sufficiently Large -0.181 -0.183 -0.170 -0.115 -0.181 -0.195 -0.186 -0.197* -0.188  
[0.120] [0.113] [0.113] [0.124] [0.120] [0.130] [0.254] [0.101] [0.125] 
Force Insufficiently Large 0.027 0.049 0.072 0.046 0.027 0.021 0.117 -0.004 0.046 
 [0.077] [0.077] [0.075] [0.077] [0.077] [0.082] [0.123] [0.094] [0.082] 
+ population no yes yes no no no no no no 
+ Eng. and region dummies no no yes no no no no no no 
+ region specific trend no no no yes no no no no no 
+ > median acre trend no no no no yes no no no no 
NOTES – This table presents sensitivity analyses of the baseline difference-in-differences specification (see Table 10), where the variables of interest Force Sufficiently and 
Insufficiently Large are equal to one for a county c in any year t after which sufficiently large or insufficiently large force has been created, using a threshold of  less than 1,500 
people per officer. The year of force creation is defined as the first year with a force for all of the year. All specifications include county and year fixed effects. The baseline 
sample includes 48 counties for the years 1832-1865. The different specifications are indicated at the top and the bottom of the table, respectively. Standard errors are clustered 
by county and shown in brackets below the estimated coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix Table A9. Crime Displacement from London to Neighboring Counties? 
 
Panel A. Pre-post comparison of means (1828-1832) 
 Log charges before 1829 Log charges after 1829 △  
Middlesex direct neighbors 5.70 5.85 0.15  
Berks 5.30 5.36 0.06  
Bucks 5.13 5.33 0.20  
Essex 6.13 6.38 0.24  
Hertford 5.38 5.52 0.14  
Surrey 6.55 6.67 0.12  
Middlesex second neighbors 5.56 5.73 0.17  
Bedford 4.79 4.71 -0.08  
Cambridge 5.17 5.13 -0.04  
Gloucester 6.38 6.69 0.30 ** 
Kent 6.45 6.53 0.08  
Northampton 5.01 5.14 0.13  
Oxford 5.03 5.41 0.38 * 
Southampton 5.93 6.18 0.25 * 
Wilts 5.74 6.07 0.33  
Remaining counties 4.38 4.57 0.20   
     
Panel B. Regressions (1828-1832)  
Y: Log charges (total) Log charges (total)   
     
Middlesex direct neighbour -0.043 -0.043   
x Post 1829 (0.081) (0.060)   
     
Middlesex second neighbour -0.025 -0.025   
x Post 1829 (0.064) (0.083)   
     
Standard errors robust clustered (county)   
County fixed effects Yes Yes   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes   
Observations 240 240     
NOTES - Panel A shows pre-post comparisons of log (total) charges before and after the introduction of the 
London Metropolitan Police in 1829 as well as the difference, respectively. Statistical significance is based on 
simple pre-post regressions (with limited numbers of observations; N=5 for single counties). Panel B shows 
regressions results for regressions of the log (total) number of charges on indicators for London/Middlesex direct 
and second neighbors interacted with a post-Met introduction dummy, respectively. London/Middlesex itself is 
excluded from the regressions; the regressions include county and year fixed effects. Robust/clustered (by county) 
standard errors are shown in parentheses below the coefficient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix Table A10. Determinants of the Timing of County Police Force Formation  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
 Early adopter? 1840 Cross-section  All Counties: 1840 (earliest possible) -1857 (last possible) adoption 
Variable Dependent Variable = adoption (1 in year of adoption)   
                              
Lag1: Charge rate 0.010 -0.012 -0.005     -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004     [0.032] [0.016] [0.022]     [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]    
Lag1: Any neighboring    -0.106 0.002 -0.005 -0.010    -0.070*     
   force   [0.197] [0.204] [0.207] [0.230]    [0.040]     
Lag1: Any sufficiently            -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
   large neighboring force           [0.025] [0.028] [0.029] [0.030] 
Lag1: Any insufficiently            -0.067* -0.094** -0.082 -0.079 
   large neighboring force           [0.036] [0.046] [0.050] [0.051] 
Lag1: Violent crime     -0.862 -0.884 -0.747      0.108 0.091 0.120 
   charge rate    [1.020] [1.024] [1.234]      [0.127] [0.127] [0.139] 
Lag1: Property crime     0.260 0.260 0.219      -0.038 -0.030 -0.042 
   charge rate    [0.155] [0.156] [0.179]      [0.028] [0.027] [0.030] 
Lag1: Other crime     -4.605** -4.650** -4.007*      0.324 0.313 0.446* 
   charge rate    [2.052] [2.073] [2.240]      [0.242] [0.236] [0.246] 
Population (in 10,000)  0.017*** 0.017*** 0.011* 0.011* 0.011   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002   [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.009]   [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Lag1: Average charge      0.021 0.036       -0.020* -0.016 
   rate, all neighbors     [0.059] [0.069]       [0.012] [0.012] 
Initial pre-county       0.000        0.000 
   police      [0.001]        [0.000] 
               
Observations 48 48 48 48 48 41  511 511 511 511 454 454 392 
R-squared 0.002 0.151 0.155 0.240 0.243 0.244   0.001 0.005 0.015 0.016 0.027 0.032 0.037 
NOTES – The table shows regression results testing for determinants of the timing of county police force formation. The outcome variable in columns (1) to (6) is a dummy variable indicating 
whether a county adopted a force in 1840 (i.e. an early adopter); the explanatory variables are lagged measures of crime and dummy variables for whether the neighboring county already had a 
police force (which in the case of early adoption implies being a neighboring county to Middlesex). The dependent variable in columns (7) to (13) is a dummy variable for all counties that is 
equal to zero until the year of police force formation and one in the year of police force formation. Standard errors (clustered by county in columns (7) to (13)) are shown in brackets below the 
estimated coefficient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix Table A11. Determinants of Initial Force Size to Population Ratio  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
 Dependent Variable (measured at force creation): 
 
Suff. Large? 
Ppl/Pol < 
1500? Ppl/Pol 
Suff. Large? 
Ppl/Pol < 
1500? Ppl/Pol 
Suff. Large? 
Ppl/Pol < 
1500? Ppl/Pol 
Fixed Geographic Variables 
Acres (in 10,000) 0.001 -27.099 -0.001 -31.207 -0.004 -34.354 
 [0.004] [18.663] [0.006] [23.103] [0.005] [30.762] 
Number of parishes (in 100) 0.010 49.912 0.051 25.820 -0.003 -19.884 
 [0.118] [384.362] [0.147] [470.753] [0.118] [481.501] 
Number of neighbors 0.029 -35.477 0.032 9.968 0.043 19.787 
 [0.048] [239.006] [0.046] [223.389] [0.040] [224.012] 
England -0.153 888.542 0.035 1,310.160 0.161 1,417.821 
 [0.179] [1,435.166] [0.319] [2,266.308] [0.332] [2,107.863] 
Variables measured in the 1851 census (shares) 
Farmer -0.017 -8.729 -0.010 -2.527 -0.017 -7.902 
 [0.017] [112.116] [0.026] [148.072] [0.024] [163.879] 
Male -0.104** 522.620 -0.103* 396.943 -0.066 429.000 
 [0.048] [388.323] [0.058] [397.435] [0.060] [470.022] 
Married 0.050 267.177 0.065 90.110 0.026 57.382 
 [0.073] [427.595] [0.094] [478.618] [0.080] [534.110] 
Native -0.049 -102.064 -0.122 137.937 -0.001 240.613 
 [0.088] [325.609] [0.109] [392.508] [0.094] [655.567] 
Employed -0.007 -246.094 0.006 -284.430 -0.003 -292.068 
 [0.031] [176.390] [0.038] [194.710] [0.035] [219.775] 
Age 0-15 -0.131 -536.135 -0.162 -222.318 -0.297* -337.007 
 [0.127] [589.462] [0.171] [767.984] [0.167] [1,005.164] 
Age 16-25 0.010 1,363.391 -0.061 1,423.109 -0.170 1,330.720 
 [0.162] [1,019.616] [0.212] [1,448.194] [0.217] [1,226.612] 
Age 26-35 -0.219 23.037 -0.245 37.629 -0.137 130.006 
 [0.209] [1,314.718] [0.272] [1,269.969] [0.281] [1,235.988] 
Age 36-45 0.005 -1,844.465 -0.142 -22.887 -0.574 -390.638 
 [0.457] [1,780.253] [0.600] [2,128.982] [0.535] [2,373.003] 
Age 46-55 -0.263 3,415.117** -0.303 3,489.476* -0.460 3,355.611* 
 [0.326] [1,645.359] [0.399] [1,873.414] [0.429] [1,838.108] 
Variables measured in the year before force adoption 
Violent crime rate   -0.453 2,916.493 -0.131 3,191.165 
   [0.978] [3,928.376] [0.890] [4,152.820] 
Property crime rate   -0.071 -161.968 -0.165 -242.323 
   [0.192] [658.132] [0.195] [834.754] 
Other crime rate   2.823 -11,572.963 3.467 -11,024.540 
   [2.640] [9,164.806] [2.554] [9,995.851] 
Any neighbors with suff. large force   -0.124 -560.707 -0.105 -544.154 
   [0.220] [1,073.534] [0.184] [1,142.446] 
Any neighbors with insuff. large force   0.069 -95.433 0.165 -13.718 
   [0.215] [977.603] [0.207] [996.988] 
Population control 
Population (in 10,000)     0.026*** 22.536 
     [0.009] [83.500] 
       
Observations 47 47 45 45 45 45 
R-squared 0.349 0.370 0.412 0.447 0.534 0.449 
NOTES - The dependent variable measures police force efficiency at the time of force formation. Census controls are measured in 1851; the 
omitted age category is older than 55. All census variables are measured as the share of the county population with characteristic X (value of 0-
100%). Pre-formation variables are measured one year prior to county police force formation (i.e. using a different year for different counties); 
pre-formation crime variables are the lagged crime rates (per 1000 population), while the neighboring force variables are indicators for whether 
any neighbors had an efficient or inefficient force in the year prior to adoption. All regressions have a single observation per county. Robust 
standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix B: Data Sources 
 
Appendix Figure B1. Excerpt from the Report or Account of the Proceedings at the Several Police Offices  
  
NOTES – The above scanned pages highlight the three different measures of crime (informations, charges, and property stolen) which we coded for each office (seen in italics) 
and each date. The date is clearly indicated at the top of the page. Note that the files for the second half of 1828 as well as for 1829 have, according to information on the website 
of the National Archives, been lost. We therefore coded data from the documents corresponding to the months of January until April for the years 1828 (MEPO 4/12), 1830 
(MEPO 4/13), 1831 (MEPO 4/15) and 1832 (MEPO 4/17).  
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Appendix Figure B2. Excerpt of the Judicial Statistics (County of Bedford, 1844)  
 
NOTES – The above page shows an example excerpt from the Judicial Statistics. We coded data from the first 
column of this table, the total number of offenders committed to trial, for each year and county for each broad 
crime category: No. 1 – No. 6.   
 
